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Abstract
There are many schemes in the literature for protecting digital data from
piracy by the use of digital ﬁngerprinting, such as frameproof codes, which
prevent traitorous users from colluding to frame an innocent user, and traitor-
tracing schemes, which enable the identiﬁcation of users involved in piracy.
The concept of traitor tracing has been applied to a digital broadcast setting
in the form of dynamic traitor-tracing schemes and sequential traitor-tracing
schemes, which could be used to combat piracy of pay-TV broadcasts, for
example. In this thesis we explore the possibility of extending the properties
of frameproof codes to this dynamic model.
We investigate the construction of l-sequential c-frameproof codes, which
prevent framing without requiring information obtained from a pirate broad-
cast. We show that they are closely related to the ordinary frameproof codes,
which enables us to construct examples of these schemes and to establish
bounds on the number of users they support.
We then deﬁne l-dynamic c-frameproof codes that can prevent framing more
eﬃciently than the sequential codes through the use of the pirate broadcast
information. We give constructions for schemes supporting an optimal number
of users in the cases where the number c of users colluding in piracy satisﬁes
c ≥ 2 or c = 1.
Finally we consider sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes that pro-
vide ongoing protection against framing by making use of the pirate broadcast.
We provide constructions of such schemes and establish bounds on the number
of users they support. In the case of a binary alphabet we use geometric struc-
tures to describe constructions, and provide new bounds. We then go on to
provide two families of constructions based on particular parameters, and we
show that some of these constructions are optimal for the given parameters.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Digital Data Requires Piracy Protection
Over the past few decades there have been signiﬁcant advances in the capacity
to store and transmit digital data, leading to a substantial increase in the
amount of material that is being provided in this form. Many types of data,
including movies, music, images and text are stored in a digital format and
are made available to consumers through media such as CDs, DVDs and the
internet. Such data are potentially worth a lot of money to their owners, with
an increasing number of consumers being willing to pay for access to data.
Storing data in a digital format has the advantage that the data can readily
be reproduced or transmitted without any degradation or loss of information.
However, the ease with which digital information can be copied makes it po-
tentially vulnerable to piracy, the production of illicit copies for which the
owner of the content has not been paid. Suppliers are interested in ways in
which they can protect their intellectual property from being stolen; there is
thus a desire for schemes that can discourage piracy of digital data.
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1.2 Outline of the Thesis
In this section we give a synopsis of the thesis, describing the contents and
the main results of each chapter. We also discuss its aims and the motivation
behind the problems investigated.
Chapters 2 and 3 of this thesis contain a survey of certain aspects of the
theory of piracy prevention present in the literature. Two commonly dis-
cussed mechanisms for implementing piracy-prevention schemes, the use of
digital fingerprinting and the strategic distribution of keys in decoder boxes,
are described in Chapter 2. This is followed by an examination of two types
of codes designed for use with such systems: c-traceability codes, which allow
coalitions of up to c traitors involved in piracy to be traced and incriminated,
and c-frameproof codes, which prevent coalitions of at most c traitors from
falsely incriminating innocent users. We give precise deﬁnitions of these codes
as well as examples of how they are constructed, and we discuss known bounds
on the number of users they can support.
In Chapter 3 we introduce the dynamic setting in which information is
continually broadcast to its recipients; this setting models such real-world
scenarios as pay-TV broadcasting. We then describe sequential traitor-tracing
schemes and dynamic traitor-tracing schemes, which result from applying the
concepts of ﬁngerprinting and traitor tracing in the dynamic setting. Again
we give examples of such schemes, and discuss bounds on the time taken to
implement them relative to the number of users that they support, and we
mention an observation of Fiat and Tassa [12] that leads to a limitation on
when such schemes can be applied.
The aim of this thesis is to examine the possibility of extending the prop-
erties of frameproof codes to the dynamic broadcast setting. Doing this would
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aﬀord a degree of piracy protection in cases when the full strength of a traitor-
tracing scheme is not required, or when there are insuﬃcient resources for the
implementation of such a scheme. In Chapter 4 we consider the sequential
model, in which access to the pirate’s broadcast is not available. We propose
a deﬁnition of l-sequential c-frameproof codes, schemes that ensure that coali-
tions of up to c traitors cannot falsely incriminate an innocent user over any
l consecutive time segments. We make some observations on how to simplify
the construction of such schemes and we show that l-sequential c-frameproof
codes are closely related to the standard c-frameproof codes. These schemes
are inﬂuenced by several parameters, namely q, the number of diﬀerent ways
in which a segment of the data can be marked, the number of users, denoted by
n, the number c of traitorous users, and l, the size of the windows of adjacent
time segments over which framing is to be prevented. We use the connection
between sequential frameproof codes and frameproof codes to establish bounds
on some of these parameters, and to describe constructions that are optimal
with respect to these bounds in the case where c = n− 1. We are particularly
interested in ﬁnding bounds for certain parameters such as l or n once the
values of the other parameters have been ﬁxed. Since we wish our schemes
to be as eﬃcient as possible in terms of implementation time and cost it is
natural to seek the maximum number of users that a scheme can support, or
the minimum time required for its implementation using a given quantity of
resources. The ultimate aim is to reconcile the upper and lower bounds for
these extremal quantities and to ﬁnd ways to construct schemes meeting these
bounds, as such constructions would result in schemes of optimal eﬃciency.
In the case of c-sequential frameproof codes, however, we are constrained by
our incomplete knowledge of the equivalent bounds for c-frameproof codes.
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In Chapter 5 we consider the situation when feedback from the pirate
broadcast is available. In this chapter we investigate schemes that require l
time segments in order to ensure no innocent user is framed, which we refer to
as l-dynamic frameproof codes. We prove a bound on the maximum number
of users supported by these schemes and provide a method of constructing
schemes that meet the bound. Dynamic frameproof codes diﬀer from sequen-
tial frameproof codes in that they are applied once to prevent framing over a
particular choice of l consecutive time segments, whereas the sequential codes
are applied continuously and prevent framing over any l consecutive segments.
This diﬀerence between the sequential and dynamic frameproof codes leads
to the deﬁnition of the sliding-window model of framing prevention, discussed
at the start of Chapter 6. The rest of the chapter is devoted to making use
of the dynamic setting to construct sliding-window dynamic frameproof codes;
as the name suggests these schemes are applied in the dynamic setting with
access to information from the pirate broadcast, but have the same sliding-
window frameproof properties as sequential frameproof codes. The use of the
pirate broadcast information results in these schemes being more eﬃcient than
the corresponding sequential schemes, protecting a given number of users over
much shorter windows. Examples of these schemes are given, and bounds on
some of their parameters are established, but a discrepancy remains between
the known upper and lower bounds. In an eﬀort to reduce this gap we proceed
to concentrate on the case where q = 2. We give a suﬃcient condition for the
existence of sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code and ﬁnd that a bound
on the possible window-lengths arises from that condition. A construction of
a code meeting that bound is given.
We then turn our attention to the use of geometric concepts in constructing
9
new sliding-window dynamic frameproof codes. We reinterpret some of our
previous results in a geometric notation, and give a lower bound on the possible
window lengths of codes arising from geometric constructions that is very close
to the upper bounds resulting from previously-discussed constructions.
In attempting to generalise these geometric constructions to make use of
alphabets of size q > 2, however, we soon discover that the resulting construc-
tions are not optimal. In Chapter 7 we attempt to ﬁnd both better construc-
tions for q > 2 and ways of comparing the diﬀerent constructions we have
discussed previously. These goals are achieved by the construction of a new
family of codes that provides a common description for all the sliding-window
dynamic frameproof codes constructed so far, and which provides parameters
that can be selected in order to optimise the number of users supported by
the resulting code. We then go on to describe a new construction that yields
more-eﬃcient schemes than the above family of constructions when the same
parameters are used. We show that this new construction protects a number
of users that is optimal for the given parameters. We then consider some
asymptotic bounds on the number of users protected when the alphabet size
becomes large. The thesis concludes with a discussion of future possibilities.
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Chapter 2
Schemes for the Prevention of
Piracy
A great deal of valuable intellectual property, such as software, music and so
on, is stored in digital form. Digital data can easily be copied and transmitted,
and this facilitates the distribution of material by its owners. Unfortunately it
has the further implication that unscrupulous people can readily make illicit
copies of the data, something which the owners naturally wish to prevent.
Many diﬀerent methods for discouraging such piracy have been proposed. In
this chapter we describe two of the most commonly discussed mechanisms
through which piracy prevention measures can be delivered. We then consider
two types of codes that can be applied in either setting, namely traceability
codes and frameproof codes, which each have slightly diﬀerent piracy-deterring
properties. We give examples of how such codes are constructed and discuss
known bounds on their sizes, and we consider the piracy protection aﬀorded
by these codes.
2.1 Mechanisms for Discouraging Piracy
The methods used to prevent piracy will naturally depend on the form in
which the protected data is stored and distributed. The ﬁrst mechanism we
11
discuss is used in the case where the data is transmitted to the recipient in a
single instance. This could include CDs carrying software or music, or DVD
movies. The second setting we discuss involves decoder boxes, as used by pay-
TV stations to enable legitimate users to decrypt encrypted broadcasts. In
this case the goal is to deter those who have not paid to watch the broadcast
from constructing illicit “pirate” decoder boxes. Most of the piracy prevention
schemes discussed in the literature are designed to ﬁt one of these two scenarios
(apart from the dynamic schemes, which we will discuss in the next chapter).
2.1.1 Digital Fingerprinting
When data is distributed on CDs or DVDs little action can be taken to stop
pirates from making illegal copies. If, however, the source of the illegal copies
can be detected then action can be taken against the pirates. This in itself
will act as a deterrent to pirates as it increases the risk of being caught, and
makes piracy less attractive as a result. The idea behind digital ﬁngerprinting
is somehow to mark the data that is given to each user so that an illegally-
made copy will contain information about the user who made the copy, much
as ordinary ﬁngerprints can be used to identify the person who left them.
The actual method for embedding marks in the data lies beyond the scope of
this thesis; some proposals are discussed in [17]. We require that the marks
satisfy two properties; the ﬁrst, in the terminology of Fiat and Tassa [12], is
that of similarity , namely that the presence of the mark should not aﬀect
the functioning of the data. For instance, if the data consists of a movie
then a person watching the movie should be unable to distinguish between
a marked and an unmarked version. The second property that we require,
termed robustness [12], is that it should be impossible for the pirate to alter or
12
remove a mark without causing noticeable damage to the actual data. There
is some debate, however, over whether it is possible to create marks of this
type. For the purposes of what follows we assume it can be done; this is known
as the watermarking assumption (see [17] for a discussion of issues associated
with watermarking).
If every user receives a copy of the data that has been uniquely marked
then any pirate copies can be traced back to the user responsible. It may be
infeasible to produce this many diﬀerent variations of the data, however. One
solution is to split the data into a ﬁnite number of sections, each of which is
marked. If there are l diﬀerent sections and you produce q diﬀerently-marked
variants of each section then that enables you to produce ql diﬀerent versions
of the entire data set. We will think of the q diﬀerent versions of a segment
as corresponding to the letters of an alphabet Q of size q; each version of the
data is then associated with a word of Ql. The set C ⊆ Ql of words used to
mark the data is then a length l, q-ary code.
If a pirate makes a copy of a single version of the data then it can be
traced to the user who owned that version. If a pirate has access to more than
one version, however, it can combine diﬀerent sections from diﬀerent versions
to try and escape being identiﬁed. Recall that we are assuming the pirate is
unable to remove or change any given mark, but there is nothing to stop it
replacing a section in one version with a section from another version.
Example 2.1 Suppose the data is marked using words of length 3 and an
alphabet Q = {0, 1, 2}. If a pirate possesses versions marked by the words
(0, 0, 1) and (1, 0, 2) then by combining the various sections it can produce
any of the words in the set {(0, 0, 1), (0, 0, 2), (1, 0, 1), (1, 0, 2)}. 
If a pirate has access to a particular set S of marking words then the set of
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new words it can form in such a manner is referred to as the set of descendents
of S.
Definition 2.1. Suppose S ⊆ Ql. We define the set of descendents of S,
denoted desc(S), by
desc(S) = {x ∈ Ql|∀ i = 1, 2, . . . , l ∃y ∈ S with xi = yi}.
We wish to be able to deter piracy even when users collude by combining
their diﬀerent versions in this manner. This can be achieved by allocating
marking words from a code C ⊆ Ql with particular properties. Two such
types of code are described later in this chapter.
2.1.2 Decoder Boxes for Encrypted Broadcasts
Pay-TV stations encrypt their broadcasts so that only paying users are able to
view their programs. This is frequently done by providing paying users with
decoder boxes that attach to their televisions and decrypt the data once it is
received. In what follows we assume that the encryption used is suﬃciently
secure that pirates cannot break the cryptosystem unless they have access to
the decryption keys contained within the boxes. A pirate with access to a
decoder box could make a replica of the box, however, thus enabling someone
who is not a paying user to decrypt the programs. In order to prevent this
we wish to be able to trace any pirate decoder box back to the legitimate box
that was copied in its construction. One way of doing this is to place a unique
set of l keys k1, k2, . . . , kl in each box. If each key ki comes from a set of q
possible keys there are ql possible boxes. The program to be broadcast is then
split into l sections, b1 to bl, each of which is encrypted using a temporary
key s1, s2, . . . , sl. The temporary key s1 is then encrypted with each of the q
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possible keys k11 to k
q
1, the key s2 is encrypted with each of the q possibilities
for ki2 and so on. The encryptions of all the si are placed together in an
enabling block, which is transmitted before the encrypted program is broadcast
(Fig. 2.1). When a paying user receives the broadcast they can then use their
enabling block encrypted movie
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Figure 2.1: Encryption of a movie for broadcast on pay-TV
key ki for i = 1, 2, . . . , l to retrieve the keys si from the enabling block, which
allows them to decrypt the program (Fig. 2.2). The set of keys for each decoder
box can be thought of as a word of length l over an alphabet Q of size q. The
set of words C ⊆ Ql that are used in the boxes is thus a q-ary, length l code.
As we saw in the case of digital ﬁngerprinting, if the pirate copies a single
box it is easy to see which user is responsible. If the pirate combines keys from
boxes whose keys correspond to words from a set S ⊆ Ql, however, then it is
capable of reproducing any box whose keys correspond to a word from the set
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Figure 2.2: Retrieving temporary keys from the enabling block
desc(S) ⊆ Ql. In the following section we describe codes that can be applied
in this situation, as well as in a ﬁngerprinting context, in an attempt to limit
the pirate’s ability to evade detection by combining keys in this manner.
2.2 Traitor Tracing
Ideally, when a pirate decoder box or a pirated CD or DVD is discovered,
we would like to be able to identify at least one of the users, referred to as
traitors, who have contributed to its manufacture. This concept is known
as traitor tracing and was ﬁrst introduced by Chor, Fiat and Naor in [9].
There are many diﬀerent deﬁnitions of traitor tracing in the literature, and an
abundance of schemes have been proposed ([9, 10, 12, 7, 15, 2, 18, 3, 19, 8, 14]),
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which have widely varying properties. For example some support black-box
traitor tracing, in which the tracing process uses the pirate decoder box as a
“black box” without requiring a knowledge of the details of its construction
(see [9, 10]). Some schemes use public key encryption ([7]), others, known
as threshold schemes have a certain probability of failure ([9, 10, 2]). Chor,
Fiat, Naor and Pinkas [10], working in the decoder-box setting, deﬁne a traitor-
tracing scheme to consist of a user initialisation scheme, an encryption scheme
and a traitor-tracing algorithm. The user intialisation scheme determines how
the keys are distributed to the users. The encryption scheme controls how
the data is encrypted, and the traitor-tracing algorithm takes the keys from a
pirate decoder box as input, and outputs at least one of the users responsible
for the piracy. They deﬁne a fully c-resilient tracing scheme to be one in which
a pirate box made by c or fewer traitors can be used as a black box to trace at
least one of the traitors, provided that the encryption scheme is not broken.
In this section we will assume that the encryption is secure, and focus on the
code used to distribute the keys, and on corresponding algorithms that will
trace a traitor given the codeword from the pirate decoder. We note that these
codes and tracing algorithms can also be applied in the digital ﬁngerprinting
setting.
2.2.1 Traceability Codes
If a pirate possesses a set S of codewords then it can produce any of the words
in the set desc(S). In order to limit the pirate’s ability to evade detection, it
is natural to use codes where there is some sort of limitation on the potential
descendants of sets of codewords. An example of such a code is a c-traceability
code.
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Definition 2.2. A set C ⊆ Ql is a c-traceability code (c-TA code) if given
any subset S ⊂ C with |S| ≤ c and any x ∈ desc(S) it follows that when a
codeword y ∈ C satisfies d(x, y) ≤ d(x, z) for all z ∈ C then y lies in S. (Here
d(x, y) = |{i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , l|xi 6= yi}| is the Hamming distance.)
This means that if a word x ∈ Ql is a descendent of a particular set of
size at most c then the codewords nearest to x (with respect to the Hamming
metric) are members of that set. Therefore if we use a c-traceability code
(either to ﬁngerprint data or to distribute keys in decoder boxes) then when
a pirate CD or decoder box is found we can examine the corresponding word
and we know that the nearest codewords correspond to some of the users
responsible for the piracy.
Example 2.2 The length 3 code C over the alphabet Q = {0, 1, 2} whose
words are (0, 0, 0), (1, 1, 1), and (2, 2, 2) is a 2-TA code. This is trivially true
since any descendent of two codewords must contain two letters from one of
those words. This descendent will have a distance of at most 1 from this
parent, a distance of at least 2 from the other parent, and a distance of 3 from
any other codeword. Hence the closest codeword is necessarily a member of
the original parent set. 
The concept of a traceability code ﬁrst appeared in Chor et al. [9, 10]
under the name of an open one-level k-resilient traceability scheme, although
an explicit construction was not given. Stinson and Wei [15] studied slightly
more general structures, which they refer to as traceability schemes; here we
restrict our attention to traceability codes as they relate more closely to the
schemes we will discuss later.
Staddon et al. [14] compare TA codes with frameproof codes and other
related structures, and provide constructions as well as bounds on the sizes of
18
such codes. In particular they give the following bound.
Theorem 2.3. [14] Let C be a q-ary, length l, c-TA code. Then
|C| ≤ q⌈ lc⌉ + 2c− 2.
Proof. Suppose C is a q-ary, length l, c-TA code with |C| > q⌈ lc⌉+2c−2. Let
A = (aij) be the |C|×l matrix whose rows are the codewords of C and divide A
into c submatrices by letting A1 be the |C| ×
⌈
l
c
⌉
matrix consisting of the ﬁrst⌈
l
c
⌉
columns of A, letting A2 consist of the next
⌈
l
c
⌉
columns and so on, with
A1, . . . , At having size |C| ×
⌈
l
c
⌉
and At+1, . . . , Ac having size |C| ×
⌊
l
c
⌋
where
t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c} satisﬁes t ≡ l (mod c). Now A1 has more than q⌈ lc⌉ + 2c− 2
rows, hence there exist two rows of A, say i1 and j1, with the corresponding
rows of A1 being identical. Let A
′
2 be the matrix obtained from A2 by removing
rows i1 and j1. Then A
′
2 has more than q
⌈ lc⌉+2c−4 rows, hence there exist two
rows i2 and j2 identical in A
′
2, and these are distinct from i1 and j1. Continue
this procedure, at each step ﬁnding identical rows iα and jα in the matrix A
′
α,
the matrix obtained by deleting rows i1, i2, . . . , ıα−1 and j1, j2, . . . , α−1 from
matrix Aα. Once this has been performed for matrices A1, . . . , Ac the result is
two disjoint sets of rows (corresponding to codewords) I = {i1, i2, . . . , ic} and
J = {j1, j2, . . . , jc} with i1 and j1 agreeing in the ﬁrst
⌈
l
c
⌉
positions, i2 and j2
agreeing in the next
⌈
l
c
⌉
positions, and so on. Let x ∈ Ql be the word whose
ﬁrst
⌈
l
c
⌉
coordinates match those of i1 and j1, and whose next
⌈
l
c
⌉
coordinates
match those of i2 and j2 and so on. Then x is a descendent of both I and
J . By the c-TA property if y is the closest codeword to x then y lies in each
parent set of size at most c, hence y ∈ I and y ∈ J . But I and J are disjoint
by construction, which leads to a contradiction. 
One way to construct c-TA codes is by using error-correcting codes. This
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is made possible by the following observation of Chor et al.
Theorem 2.4. [9][10] Let C be a q-ary, length l code containing n codewords
whose minimum (Hamming) distance d satisfies d > l − l
c2
for some positive
integer c. Then C is a c-TA code.
Proof. Suppose C is such a code. The distance between any two codewords
being greater than l− l
c2
it follows that any two codewords agree in fewer than
l
c2
coordinates. Let x ∈ Ql, and suppose x ∈ desc(S) for some S ⊂ C with
|S| ≤ c. Let z ∈ C be a closest codeword to x, so that d(x, z) ≤ d(x, w) for all
w ∈ C. Then x and z have at least l
c
coordinates in common; denote the set
of coordinates in which they agree by I. As S is a parent set of x containing
c codewords there exists some codeword y ∈ S agreeing with x in at least
|I|
c
> l
c2
of the coordinates in I. But y also agrees with z in these coordinates;
because of the minimum distance this implies that y = z, so z ∈ S. Hence C
satisﬁes the c-TA condition. 
Blackburn [5] observes that this result is still true in the case where the
minimum distance satisﬁes d > l−⌈ l
c2
⌉
. Examples of codes with an appropriate
minimum distance are provided by Reed-Solomon codes (see [5]), as in the
following construction.
Construction 2.5. Let q be a prime power, and l be a positive integer with
l ≤ q. Let α1, α2, . . . , αl be distinct elements of the field F = GF (q). We
define a code C by setting
C =
{(
f(α1), f(α2), . . . , f(αl)
)∣∣∣∣f ∈ F [x], deg f <
⌈
l
c2
⌉}
.
(This is a specific example of the Reed-Solomon construction.)
The number of distinct polynomials over f with degree less than
⌈
l
c2
⌉
is
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q⌈ lc2 ⌉; as l ≥ ⌈ l
c2
⌉
each choice of polynomial will give rise to a distinct code-
word, hence |C| = q⌈ lc2 ⌉. We observe that no two distinct codewords agree
in
⌈
l
c2
⌉
or more positions, for by interpolation the corresponding polynomials
would then be equal. Thus the minimum distance of C is at least l− ⌈ l
c2
⌉
. By
Theorem 2.4 we have that C is a c-traceability code.
Note that as for Construction 2 of [6] the condition that l ≤ q can be
weakened to l ≤ q+1 by allowing the αi to be distinct elements ofGF (q)∪{∞},
where f(∞) is deﬁned to be the coeﬃcient of x⌈ lc2 ⌉−1 in f .
The code described in Example 2.2 is in fact a Reed-Solomon code. Here
we give a less-trivial example of this construction.
Example 2.3 Let l = 5, c = 2 and q = 5; then
⌈
l
c2
⌉
= 2. Let α1 = 0, α2 = 1,
α3 = 2, α4 = 3 and α5 = 4. There are 25 polynomials over GF (5) of degree
less than two, so the code resulting from Construction 2.5 contains 25 words.
For instance, the polynomials 3, x, x + 1 and 2x + 3 give rise to the words
(3, 3, 3, 3, 3), (0, 1, 2, 3, 4), (1, 2, 3, 4, 0) and (3, 0, 2, 4, 1) respectively. This code
has minimum distance 5− 2 = 3, and is a 2-TA code. 
Blackburn [5] poses the open problem of whether this Reed-Solomon con-
struction provides optimal c-TA codes for large alphabet sizes.
2.3 Frameproof Codes
It may be the case that two or more users involved in piracy attempt to avoid
detection by combining their codewords to produce a word corresponding to
another user, in the hope that the innocent user will be blamed for the piracy.
Frameproof codes were designed to prevent framing of this nature; they were
ﬁrst proposed by Boneh and Shaw [8]. We use the following deﬁnition of a
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frameproof code, which appears in [12]. Note that this is slightly diﬀerent from
the original Boneh and Shaw deﬁnition, as that deﬁnition allows pirates with
the ability to completely eﬀace marks, which are prohibited by our robustness
requirement.
Definition 2.6. A code C ⊆ Ql is a c-frameproof code if every set S ⊂ C
with |S| ≤ c satisfies desc(S) ∩ C = S.
Thus when a frameproof code is used to ﬁngerprint data (or to assign keys
to decoder boxes) no set of c or fewer traitors can collude to frame a user
outside of that set.
Example 2.4 The binary length 3 code C whose words are listed below has
the property that any two distinct words agree in at most one position.
(0, 0, 0)
(1, 1, 0)
(0, 1, 1)
(1, 0, 1)
This implies that it is a 2-frameproof code. For, if x ∈ C is framed by
S = {y1, y2} ⊂ C then x 6= y1 means x and y1 agree in at most one coordi-
nate. This implies that x and y2 must agree in the remaining two coordinates,
which in turn implies that x = y2, so x is framed by S if and only if x ∈ S. 
In fact we have already seen several examples of c-frameproof codes, as
shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 2.7. [14] If C ⊂ Ql is a c-TA code, then it is also a c-frameproof
code.
Proof. Let C ⊂ Ql be a c-TA code, but suppose that it is not c-frameproof.
Then there exists some set S ⊂ C with |S| ≤ c and some x ∈ C \ S with
x ∈ desc(S). But x ∈ C and d(x, x) = 0 so d(x, x) ≤ d(x, z) for all z ∈ C, yet
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x /∈ S thus the c-TA property is contradicted. Hence we conclude that every
c-TA code must be c-frameproof. 
Therefore we see that the c-TA property is a stronger condition than the
c-frameproof property, and all the c-TA codes described in the previous section
are also c-frameproof codes.
Given values of q, l and c we would like to know the largest possible size
of a q-ary, length l, c-frameproof code. The literature contains many bounds
on this quantity, some of which we state below.
Theorem 2.8. Let l ≥ 2 and c ≥ 2 be integers, and let t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , c}
satisfy t ≡ l (mod c), so that l = t⌈ l
c
⌉
+ (c− t)⌊ l
c
⌋
. If C is a q-ary, length l,
c-frameproof code then
1. [6] |C| ≤ max
{
q⌈ lc⌉, t
(
q⌈ lc⌉ − 1
)
+ (c− t)
(
q⌊ lc⌋ − 1
)}
;
2. [16, 6] |C| ≤
(
l
l−(t−1)⌈ lc⌉
)
q⌈ lc⌉ +
(
l⌈
l
c
⌉− 1
)
q⌈ lc⌉−1.
Proof. (1) Let C be a q-ary, length l, c-frameproof code. With each subset
S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , l} we associate a subset US ⊆ C by setting
US = {x ∈ C|∄y ∈ C with xi = yi for all i ∈ S}.
Thus every word x in US is determined uniquely by its components xi with
i ∈ S, so |US| ≤ q|S| as there are at most q|S| possible choices for these xi. If
the set C \US is non-empty then at least one of these choices belongs to words
in C \ US and hence does not correspond to a word of US. Thus if |C| > q|S|
then |US| is at most q|S| − 1.
Partition the set {1, 2, . . . , l} into c disjoint subsets S1, S2, . . . , Sc where
|Sj| =
⌈
l
c
⌉
when j ≤ t and |Si| =
⌊
l
c
⌋
when j > t. Then∣∣∣∣
c⋃
j=1
USj
∣∣∣∣ ≤ t(q⌈ lc⌉ − 1)+ (c− t)(q⌊ lc⌋ − 1).
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The proof of the theorem results from the fact that C =
⋃c
i=1 USi. Suppose
that there exists a word x ∈ C \⋃ci=1 USi. Then for each j = 1, 2, . . . , c there
exists another word yj 6= x in C that agrees with x in all the positions i ∈ Sj,
as x /∈ USj . From this it follows that x ∈ desc({y1, y2, . . . yc}), in contradiction
of the c-frameproof property of C. Hence we conclude that C =
⋃c
i=1 USi , so
|C| ≤ t
(
q⌈ lc⌉ − 1
)
+ (c− t)
(
q⌊ lc⌋ − 1
)
.
(2) From the proof of (1) we know that if S1, S2, . . . Sc are non-empty sets
partitioning {1, 2, . . . , l} then C = ⋃cj=1USj . Let k = ⌈ lc⌉ and let D ⊆ C be
the set of codewords that are not deﬁned uniquely by any choice of k − 1 of
their coordinates, so if S = {S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , l}||S| = k − 1} then
D = {x ∈ C|∀S ∈ S ∃y ∈ C \ {x} with xi = yi for all i ∈ S}.
From the deﬁnition we see that D = C \⋃S∈S US; together with the fact that
|S| = ( l
k−1
)
this gives us |D| ≥ |C|−( l
k−1
)
qk−1. Thus any bound on the size of
D translates into a bound on the size of C; we now proceed to establish such
a bound.
For any set S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , l} we deﬁne VS = US ∩D, and we deﬁne the set
V by V = {VS|S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , l}, |S| = k}. A bound on the size of D can be
derived by counting in two ways the number of pairs (x, S) for which VS ∈ V
and x ∈ VS. Since |S| = k we have |VS| ≤ |US| ≤ qk, so for a given S there
are at most qk possible x ∈ VS, and there are
(
l
k
)
possible choices of S with
|S| = k. Hence the number of such pairs is at most ( l
k
)
qk.
There are |D| possible choices for x; let χ be the maximum possible size
of a family F of sets VS ∈ V not containing x. It follows that the number of
sets Vs ∈ V with x ∈ VS is at least |V| − χ =
(
l
k
) − χ, hence the number of
possible pairs (s, VS) with x ∈ Vs is at least |D|
((
l
k
)− χ).
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Combining these two bounds implies that(
l
k
)
qk ≥ |D|
((
l
k
)
− χ
)
,
therefore
|D| ≤ qk
(
1
1− χ/( l
k
)).
We observe that if S1, S2, . . . , St are pairwise disjoint k-subsets of {1, 2, . . . , l}
then D =
⋃t
j=1 VSj . For, as the Sj are pairwise disjoint we have
|{1, 2, . . . , l} \
t⋃
j=1
Sj| = l − tk = (c− t)(k − 1).
Thus it is possible to construct (c− t) disjoint (k−1)-subsets St+1, St+2, . . . Sc
partitioning {1, 2, . . . , l}\⋃tj=1 Sj , so C = ⋃cj=1USj . However for t+1 ≤ j ≤ c
we have VSj = D ∩ USj = ∅ by deﬁnition of D as |Sj| = k − 1. Hence
t⋃
j=1
VSj =
c⋃
j=1
VSj
= D ∩
c⋃
j=1
USj
= D ∩ C
= D.
This implies that there do not exist t pairwise-disjoint subsets in F , for the
union of any t disjoint sets in V is D, which implies that x is contained in
at least one of them. A family of subsets of a set is said to be t-colliding
if there do not exist t pairwise-disjoint subsets in the family; F is therefore
t-colliding. The following lemma, due to Blackburn [6] gives a bound on the
size of t-colliding families.
Lemma 2.9. [6] Let l,t and k be positive integers with tk ≤ l. A t-colliding
family of of k-subsets of {1, 2, . . . , l} contains at most ( l
k
) (t−1)k
l
elements.
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Thus χ ≤ ( l
k
) (t−1)k
l
and |D| ≤ qk
(
1
1− (t−1)k
l
)
= qk
(
l
l−(t−1)k
)
. From this we
deduce |C| ≤ qk
(
l
l−(t−1)k
)
+
(
l
k−1
)
qk−1 hence proving the result. 
A lower bound on the maximum size of a frameproof code is provided, in
the case where q is a prime power, by a result due to Cohen and Encheva [11].
Theorem 2.10. [11] Let Q = GF (q). A length l linear code C (i.e. a code
whose codewords form a vector space over Q) of dimension
⌈
l
c
⌉
and minimum
distance l − ⌈ l
c
⌉
+ 1 is a c-frameproof code.
Proof. Let C be such a code. As C has minimum distance l−⌈ l
c
⌉
+1 it follows
that any two codewords agree in at most
⌈
l
c
⌉− 1 positions. This implies that
no c codewords can frame any other, since c codewords could contribute to at
most c
(⌈
l
c
⌉ − 1) ≤ l − 1 positions of a further codeword, thus at least c + 1
codewords would be required for framing. 
Linear codes with minimum distance d, dimension k and length l that sat-
isfy d = l − k + 1 are known as MDS codes; Reed-Solomon codes provide
an example of codes known to meet this bound. Therefore, as in the case of
c-TA codes, it is possible to construct c-frameproof codes from Reed-Solomon
codes of suitable parameters. Taking Construction 2.5 but requiring that the
polynomials have degree less than
⌈
l
c
⌉
instead of
⌈
l
c2
⌉
will give codes of the
required parameters; this technique appears as Construction 2 of [6]. These
codes contain q⌈ lc⌉ codewords instead of the the q
⌈
l
c2
⌉
codewords of the cor-
responding c-TA code, demonstrating that the weaker c-frameproof condition
enables the construction of much larger codes than are possible with the c-TA
condition.
We therefore have the following lower bound on the size of c-frameproof
codes.
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Corollary 2.11. Let q be a prime power, and let l ≤ q+1. Then there exists
a q-ary, length l, c-frameproof code of size q⌈ lc⌉.
The following example is the c-frameproof parallel of Example 2.3.
Example 2.5 Let l = 5, c = 2 and q = 5; then
⌈
l
c
⌉
= 3. There are 125
polynomials over GF (5) of degree less than three, so the 2-frameproof code
resulting from the modiﬁed Construction 2.5 contains 125 words. This is ﬁve
times as many words as in the 5-ary, length 5, 2-TA code in Example 2.3. 
There are other constructions in the literature that yield larger codes in
certain cases [6, 16], but most of these are concerned with achieving good
asymptotic results as q goes to inﬁnity, and there are still discrepancies between
the absolute upper and lower bounds for most choices of parameter. In the
case where l ≤ c, however, precise results are known.
Theorem 2.12. [6] There exist q-ary, length l, c-frameproof codes of size
l(q− 1) when q ≥ 2 and 2 ≤ l ≤ c, but no larger code with these parameters is
possible.
An upper bound on the size of such codes is provided by Theorem 2.8.
The lower bound required to prove this theorem comes from the following
construction, which yields codes that are c-frameproof for any c ≥ 2, regardless
of their length.
Construction 2.13. Let Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}. For i = 1, 2, . . . , l define the
set Ci by Ci = {x ∈ Ql|xi 6= 0 and xj = 0 for j 6= i}. Let C =
⋃l
i=1Ci. The
sets Ci are disjoint and have size (q − 1), therefore the size of C is l(q − 1).
We claim that C is a c-frameproof code for any c with 2 ≤ c ≤ l(q − 1)− 1.
Proof. This construction appears as Construction 1 in Blackburn [6]. A word
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x ∈ Ci has a symbol in position i that is shared by no other word in C.
Therefore no combination of other words can frame x, since no descendent
of any set of other words matches x in position i. As each word lies in Ci
for some i it follows that no word can be framed by a set of other words, no
matter what the size. Hence C is indeed c-frameproof for any c ≥ 2. 
Example 2.6 Let Q = {0, 1, 2, 3}. Construction 2.13 can be used to obtain
the following length 4 code of size 4(4− 1) = 12.
(1, 0, 0, 0)
(2, 0, 0, 0)
(3, 0, 0, 0)
(0, 1, 0, 0)
(0, 2, 0, 0)
(0, 3, 0, 0)
(0, 0, 1, 0)
(0, 0, 2, 0)
(0, 0, 3, 0)
(0, 0, 0, 1)
(0, 0, 0, 2)
(0, 0, 0, 3)

We have now seen how traceability codes and frameproof codes can be
applied in an eﬀort to thwart piracy. In the following chapters we will see sit-
uations in which these schemes cannot be applied successfully; new approaches
will have to be adopted as a result. Nevertheless we will see that some of the
new schemes relate in substantial ways to those we have seen in this chapter.
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Chapter 3
Piracy Prevention in a Dynamic
Setting
In the previous chapter we discussed schemes for preventing piracy of pay-
TV broadcasts. By controlling how decryption keys are allocated to users we
are able to trace pirate decoder boxes back to the users responsible, thereby
discouraging traitors from giving away copies of their keys. A traitorous user
may decide, however, to use his or her keys to decrypt the program and then
rebroadcast it in the clear instead, essentially acting as a pirate TV station.
If this occurs then we can no longer use the key distribution as a means of
tracing the culprits. Ideally we would like to be able to gain information
about the traitors from the pirate broadcast: this suggests that it might be
useful to adapt the ﬁngerprinting techniques discussed previously for use in a
broadcast situation. This idea was ﬁrst proposed by Fiat and Tassa in [12].
In the following sections we describe this dynamic model and discuss schemes
for tracing traitors within this model. We will refer to previously-discussed
scheme as static schemes to distinguish them from the dynamic ones.
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3.1 The Dynamic Model
The basic scenario in which we are interested involves valuable digital data,
such as the output of a pay-TV station, being broadcast continuously to a
set of users U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} who pay to receive it. A pirate is a set
T = {t1, t2, . . . , tc} ⊂ U of users, known as traitors, that illegally rebroadcasts
the data. Fiat and Tassa, in their paper on dynamic traitor tracing [12],
were the ﬁrst to apply ﬁngerprinting techniques similar to those discussed in
Section 2.1.1 in such a setting. As in the static case the content, such as a movie
or TV program, can be split into sections each of which might correspond to
a few minutes of the program. We assume that it is possible to mark each
segment in a robust way, with the presence of the marks being undetectable
by the viewer. If q diﬀerently-marked variants of each segment are produced
we can think of them as corresponding to letters of an alphabet of size q. We
then wish to distribute diﬀerently-marked variants to diﬀerent users; in the
following sections we discuss schemes for determining how to distribute the
marks. As for the distribution itself, Fiat and Tassa suggest a couple of ways
in which this might be carried out. Their ﬁrst suggestion requires that each
user share a unique symmetric key with the broadcaster. For segment t of the
program, version i of that segment is encrypted with a randomly-chosen key
kit, for each i = 1, 2, . . . , q. The key k
i
t is then individually encrypted and sent
to each user who is to receive version i of this segment, then at the appropriate
time all q diﬀerently-encrypted versions of the segment are broadcast. This
ensures that each user can only decrypt the marked version that is intended
for them. Fiat and Tassa mention that broadcast encryption could be used to
send the appropriate keys to the users, thereby eliminating the need to send
individual messages to each user; see [12] for other suggestions in making this
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distribution process more eﬃcient.
We have a set U = {u1, u2, . . . , un} of n users, and a marking alphabet Q
of size q. During time segment j user ui is allocated a segment with the mark
mij ∈ Q. At this time the pirate can only broadcast a version of segment j
marked with mtjj for some tj ∈ T .
Definition 3.1. A pirate broadcast sequence corresponding to a pirate T is a
sequence {ξj}ij=1 where for each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i} we have ξj = mtjj for some
tj ∈ T .
Such a sequence represents a possible output by the pirate between times
1 and i.
Example 3.1 Suppose we have four users {u1, u2, u3, u4} and an alphabet
Q = {a, b, c}, and that users u3 and u4 decide to collude in piracy. If the
marks on the ﬁrst three segments are distributed as in the following table:
1 2 3
u1 a b c
u2 a c a
u3 a b b
u4 b a b
then the possible pirate broadcast sequences corresponding to T = {u3, u4}
are:
a, b, b
a, a, b
b, b, b
b, a, b.

A mark that is received by precisely one user at some time is referred to as
a unique mark. If the symbol broadcast by the pirate at any time is a unique
mark then we can deduce the identity of one of the traitors, as only one user
is capable of contributing that mark to the pirate broadcast.
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Producing and then broadcasting a large number of diﬀerent variants is
very expensive, so ideally q is kept as small as possible. The number of seg-
ments required to implement a particular scheme relates directly to the time
that it takes to run, so schemes which require fewer segments are more ef-
ﬁcient. In the following sections we consider speciﬁc traitor-tracing schemes
that work in this dynamic setting, and we discuss their eﬃciency based on
these considerations.
3.2 Sequential Traitor Tracing
In a static traitor-tracing scheme marks are distributed to the users, then
the marks from pirate copies are used to trace the traitors. In the dynamic
model there is the potential for feedback from the pirate broadcast to be used
in determining the mark distribution, as well as in the tracing. The pirate
could attempt to thwart this, however, by delaying the start of the pirate
broadcast until the legitimate broadcast containing the mark distribution was
completed. This is referred to as the delayed rebroadcast attack, and sequential
traitor-tracing schemes were proposed by Safavi-Naini and Wang to counter-
act it [13]. In their conception of sequential traitor-tracing schemes the marks
are distributed according to a predetermined mark allocation table, and trac-
ing commences as soon as information from the pirate broadcast is received;
here we restrict our attention to the case in which this occurs after the mark
distribution is complete. In constructing sequential traitor-tracing schemes we
assume that the pirate coalition has size at most c for some known integer c.
The mark allocation table is an n×l arrayM = (mij) with entries from the
mark alphabet Q, where n is the number of users, and l is the number of time
segments needed to implement the scheme. The marks are then distributed
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to the users according to this table, with user i receiving the symbol mij at
time j. The rows of the matrix M can be thought of as the words of a q-ary,
length l code C and the corresponding pirate broadcast will be a word in Ql
that is a descendent of the set of at most c words belonging to the traitors.
In order for a matrix to be the mark allocation table of a sequential traitor-
tracing scheme we require that there exists a deterministic algorithm taking
as input a pirate broadcast sequence coming from a set of c or fewer traitors
and outputting the identity of at least one of those traitors. (Note that in
general it is only possible to guarantee the identiﬁcation of one of the traitors,
since the pirate set can always elect to broadcast the versions corresponding
to a single traitorous user.) This requirement places a condition on the code
C that is equivalent to C being a c-IPP code.
Definition 3.2. Let C ⊂ Ql be a code. A set S ∈ C is a parent set of a word
x ∈ Ql if x ∈ desc(S). Denote the set of all parent sets of x of size less than
or equal to c by Hc(x); thus Hc(x) = {S ⊆ C||S| ≤ c, x ∈ desc(S)}. We say
that the code C is a c-IPP code if for all words x ∈ Ql either Hc(x) = ∅, or
⋂
S∈Hc(x)
S 6= ∅.
If a mark allocation table is a c-IPP code then given any pirate broadcast
Ξ there exists at least one user u who is a member of every set of c or fewer
users capable of producing Ξ, which implies that u is necessarily a traitor.
If, however, the code does not have the c-IPP property then there exists a
potential pirate broadcast x ∈ Ql that will not allow us to trace any traitor,
since for each user u capable of having contributed to x there exists a pirate
set T ⊂ U \ {u} of size at most c that could also have produced x.
We have already seen examples of c-IPP codes:
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Theorem 3.3. [14] Every c-TA code is a c-IPP code.
Proof. Let C ⊂ Ql be a c-TA code. If x ∈ desc(S) for some S ⊂ C containing
at most c words (i.e. if Hc(x) 6= ∅) then the (nonempty) set Y of codewords
closest to x is contained in S. As this is true for any parent S of x, so Y
is contained in the intersection of all parent sets S with |S| ≤ c, hence this
intersection is nonempty. Therefore C satisﬁes the c-IPP property. 
There exist c-IPP codes that are not c-TA codes (see, for example, [14]).
What the c-TA property provides, however, is a natural algorithm for ﬁnding
a parent: simply take the closest codeword(s). Using a c-TA code as a mark
allocation table thus yields a scheme capable of tracing at least one traitor.
Once one traitor has been traced and disconnected, a similar scheme as-
suming the existence of at most c − 1 traitors can be run in order to catch
another traitor and so on in sequence, hence the name sequential.
As the mark allocation table of a sequential traitor-tracing scheme corre-
sponds to a c-IPP code any bounds on the number of words in such a code will
serve to bound the number of users that can be accommodated by a sequential
traitor-tracing scheme. The following bound is due to Alon and Stav [1].
Theorem 3.4. [1] Define
s(c) =
{
c2
4
+ c when c is even,
c2
4
+ c− 1
4
when c is odd.
A q-ary, length l, c-IPP code has at most s(c)q⌈ ls(c)⌉ codewords.
This allows us to bound the minimum l for which there exists a sequential
traitor-tracing scheme that supports n users and uses l segments.
Corollary 3.5. A sequential traitor-tracing scheme that supports n users
and assumes the existence of at most c traitors requires the use of at least
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s(c) logq
n
s(c)
− s(c) + 1 segments for its implementation.
Proof. We know that the words of the mark allocation table form a c-IPP
code, and therefore by Theorem 3.4 we have n ≤ s(c)q⌈ ls(c)⌉. From this we
deduce that
logq
n
s(c)
≤
⌈
l
s(c)
⌉
.
Therefore
s(c) logq
n
s(c)
≤ s(c)
⌈
l
s(c)
⌉
≤ l + s(c)− 1.
The result follows directly. 
We see therefore that to implement a sequential traitor-tracing scheme
requires around c
2
4
logq
4n
c2
or more segments to catch one traitor; when c = 2,
for instance, this is approximately logq n.
3.3 Dynamic Traitor Tracing
It is through schemes such as dynamic traitor-tracing schemes that the dy-
namic model really comes into its own. In these schemes the feedback from
the pirate broadcast sequence is used not only for traitor tracing but also for
determining the mark allocation, which is altered on the ﬂy in response to
the pirate’s broadcast. This extra information means that dynamic traitor
tracing can be carried out in a much shorter time than sequential tracing.
Furthermore, unlike the sequential schemes these schemes do not require prior
knowledge of the number of traitors. It is with such schemes in mind that the
dynamic model was ﬁrst proposed by Fiat and Tassa [12]. They deﬁne a wa-
termarking scheme to be deterministic if it traces all traitors without falsely
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incriminating any innocent users; the following example of such a scheme
comes from their paper [12].
Construction 3.6. [12] This algorithm requires the use of c + 1 different
variants and runs in time at most
(
n
c
)
+2
∑c−1
t=0
(
n
t
)
. Note that prior knowledge
of the value of c is not assumed.
Suppose there exists a set U of n users and a mark alphabet Q ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Proceed as follows.
1. Set t = 1.
2. (a) Choose a set W = {w1, w2, . . . , wt} ⊂ U of t users, give user wi
the mark i, and all users in U \W the mark 0. Unless situation
2b occurs, choose another set of t users and distribute the marks
similarly. Repeat until each t-subset of users has been chosen once,
then increase t by one and proceed as before.
(b) If the pirate broadcasts a unique mark then the corresponding user
is guilty. Disconnect that user, subtract one from the value of t and
continue from step 2a.
3. When the final traitor is eliminated the value of t becomes 0 and piracy
ceases. The algorithm terminates at this point.
The goal of this algorithm is to assign unique marks to all the traitors,
thus forcing one of them to incriminate his or herself. The parameter t acts
as a lower bound on the number of traitors: initially set to 1 it is gradually
increased until a traitor is caught, at which point it decreases by 1. We note
that the value of t never exceeds c, for if t = c one of the c-subsets of U is the
pirate, T . When this subset is chosen, each traitor receives a unique mark,
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hence the pirate broadcast is necessarily a unique mark that incriminates one
of the traitors, and t decreases to c− 1. As only c− 1 traitors remain so one
of the choices of (c − 1)-subset will result in all remaining traitors receiving
unique marks, and so on. Thus this algorithm traces all traitors yet never
requires more than c+ 1 diﬀerently-marked variants.
Example 3.2 The following table demonstrates a possible run of this algo-
rithm for four users u1, u2, . . . , u4, where users u1 and u3 are pirates.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
u1 1 0 0 0 1 1
u2 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 0
u3 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1
u4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
T 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1
t 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 0
During the ﬁrst four time segments the value of t is one; as no traitor is
uncovered in that time t is increased to two, and sets of two users are given
unique marks at each time. At time 6 user u1 is incriminated and subsequently
disconnected; the value of t is decreased to one. The remaining traitor u3 is
incriminated at time 8. 
In devising dynamic traitor-tracing schemes we wish to minimise both the
number of marks needed and the implementation time. The above scheme
catches c traitors with the aid of c+1 marks; in fact it is impossible to reduce
this ﬁgure any further.
Theorem 3.7. [12] A deterministic watermarking scheme that can trace a set
of c colluding traitors requires the use of a marking alphabet of size at least
c+ 1.
Proof. If every member of a pirate coalition is assigned a unique mark at some
time then the pirate has no choice but to broadcast one of those marks and the
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corresponding traitor is thus incriminated. If, however, some traitor receives
a mark that is shared with another user then by broadcasting this mark the
pirate can avoid incrimination. If there are c colluding traitors but only c
symbols available then, by the pigeon-hole principle, at each time some traitor
receives a symbol that is also received by another user. By broadcasting
this symbol the pirate can avoid detection in each time segment. Hence a
watermarking scheme using c or fewer symbols cannot be deterministic. 
The scheme described in Construction 3.6 demonstrates the existence of
dynamic traitor-tracing schemes using the minimal number c + 1 of symbols;
its running time, however, is exponential in c. In [12] Fiat and Tassa present
two additional schemes, one running in time O(c logn) but requiring 2c + 1
symbols, and one using c+1 symbols with a running time of O(3cc logn): still
exponential in c, but an improvement on the initial scheme. They pose the
problem of whether there exists a deterministic scheme using c+1 symbols that
runs in a time polynomial in c. This question is answered in the aﬃrmative
by Berkman, Parnas and Sgall in [4], who provide an algorithm using c + 1
variants and requiring time Θ(c2+ c logn). They show that this running time
is optimal.
We have seen that it is possible to ﬁnd algorithms for tracing traitors
that are polynomial in the number c of traitors provided that at least c + 1
diﬀerently-marked variants are used. If the number of traitors is high, how-
ever, the broadcaster may not have suﬃcient resources to implement such a
scheme. Nevertheless, the broadcaster may still wish to make use of dynamic
digital ﬁngerprinting in some fashion. We have seen how static c-TA codes
relate to sequential traitor-tracing schemes, and how dynamic schemes can
be used to provide even more-eﬃcient traitor tracing. In the static case we
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have also seen how c-frameproof codes can be used to ensure innocent users
are not falsely incriminated by pirates, without actually having to trace the
traitors responsible. In the following chapters we will see how similar ideas
can be translated into the dynamic setting, thus providing protection for in-
nocent users in situations where there are insuﬃcient resources to implement
a deterministic traitor-tracing scheme.
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Chapter 4
Sequential Frameproof Codes
In Chapter 3 we saw how the concept of traitor tracing applied in a dynamic
context lead to the development of sequential and dynamic traitor-tracing
schemes. If you are lacking the resources to trace traitors but still wish to
prevent pirates from framing innocent users you might hope to translate the
concept of frameproof codes in a similar fashion to the dynamic setting. In this
chapter we explore how to prevent framing without recourse to the information
contained in the pirate’s broadcast. We begin by proposing a deﬁnition for
l-sequential c-frameproof codes, which prevent framing by up to c traitors over
l consecutive time segments, then describe closely-related functions that can
be used to simplify their construction. We then show that in fact sequential
c-frameproof codes are closely connected to ordinary c-frameproof codes, with
the existence of one implying the existence of the other and vice versa. Finally
we consider sequential frameproof codes that protect users from any number
of pirates. We provide a construction of such an l-sequential code that uses
an alphabet of size q to protect n users with l =
⌈
n
q−1
⌉
and show that this is
optimal, in that it is not possible to protect n users when l <
⌈
n
q−1
⌉
.
40
4.1 Definitions
In a sequential traitor-tracing scheme code marks are broadcast one at a time
and the information contained in the pirate broadcast is used to disconnect
traitorous users, hence the set of users decreases with time.
In the context of frameproof codes, however, our goal is somewhat diﬀerent.
In this instance we do not seek to identify the traitors from their broadcast,
rather we wish solely to prevent the pirate from broadcasting a sequence of
segments corresponding to that allocated to some innocent user. We propose
the following deﬁnition of a sequential frameproof code:
Definition 4.1. An l-sequential c-frameproof code is a function M mapping
N+×U to Q with (j, u) 7→Mj(u), such that for any pirate T with |T | ≤ c, and
for any sequence of marks {ξj}i+l−1j=i broadcast by that pirate over l consecutive
time segments, there is no legitimate user u ∈ U \ T with Mj(u) = ξj for all
j = i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ l − 1.
During time section j the functionM assigns to user u the segment marked
with mark Mj(u); the sequential c-frameproof property ensures that over the
course of any l consecutive time segments the sequence of marked segments
broadcast by any pirate T with |T | ≤ c will diﬀer from that allocated to
any innocent user. We refer to this as the l-sequential c-frameproof condition.
If M is an l-sequential c-frameproof code for all c ≥ 1 then we refer to it
simply as an l-sequential frameproof code. The integer l will be known as the
convergence time of the code.
If at some time t a user u receives a mark received by no other user at that
time we refer to this as a unique mark. If the pirate broadcast ξt is a unique
mark then we know that the user who received the mark must be part of the
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pirate coalition.
Example 4.1 Let U = {u1, u2, . . . un} and Q = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and deﬁne M
by setting M(i, uj) = j for all i ∈ N+. Then M is an l-sequential frameproof
code for any l ≥ 1, since the fact that no two users get the same mark at any
time means that no user can be framed during any time interval. 
The code described above is rather trivial, and has a particularly simple
description. In general we might expect to have more diﬃculty in describing
the function M. Our task is made somewhat easier, however, by observing
that we can construct an appropriate function M by simply specifying the
values that it takes on the ﬁrst l time segments.
Lemma 4.2. Suppose there exists a user set U of size n, a mark alphabet
Q, and a function f cl : {1, 2, . . . , l} × U → Q. Then f cl can be thought of as
a function for distributing marked segments for the first l time intervals of
a broadcast and it is possible to extend it to a function M : N+ × U → Q as
follows. Given f cl letM : N+×U → Q be defined by settingM(i, u) = f cl (i′, u),
where i′ is the unique element of {1, 2, . . . , l} with i ≡ i′ (mod l). If f cl obeys
the l-sequential c-frameproof condition over this time thenM is an l-sequential
c-frameproof code.
Proof. Consider the segments broadcast between times i and i + l − 1. Sup-
pose there is a pirate T of size at most c capable of framing some innocent
user u ∈ U \ T over this interval, so that for each j ∈ {i, i+ 1, . . . , i+ l − 1}
there exists tj ∈ T such that mj(u) = mj(tj). By the deﬁnition of M,
we have mj(u) = mj′(u) whenever j ≡ j′ (mod l). As such, for each time
j′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . l}, there exists j ∈ {i, i + 1, . . . , i + l − 1} for which we have
mj′(u) = mj(u) = mj(tj) = mj′(tj). It follows that the pirate T can frame
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user u in the ﬁrst l time segments, which contradicts the assumption that f cl
has the sequential c-frameproof property in this time, since for j ∈ {1, 2, . . . l}
we have mj(v) = f
c
l (j, v) for any v ∈ U . 
Thanks to this lemma we know that to construct l-sequential c-frameproof
codes we need only deﬁne their behaviour over the ﬁrst l time segments. We
will make use of this fact in subsequent constructions, including our demon-
stration of how sequential c-frameproof codes can be constructed from ordinary
c-frameproof codes.
4.2 The Connection Between c-Frameproof
Codes and Sequential c-Frameproof Codes
We have deﬁned sequential c-frameproof codes, but as yet have seen few ex-
amples. It turns out, however, that they are essentially familiar objects under
a new guise: since neither the set of users, nor the allocation of marked seg-
ments are aﬀected by the pirate broadcast the sequential setting is in fact
closely related to the static case, as detailed in the following lemmas. First we
show that by restricting an l-sequential c-frameproof code to any window of l
consecutive time segments we can obtain an ordinary c-frameproof code.
Theorem 4.3. Suppose M is an l-sequential c-frameproof code over an al-
phabet Q of size q protecting a set U of users with |U | = n. Fix some integer
j ≥ 1 and associate a word xu =
(
Mj(u),Mj+1(u), . . . ,Mj+l−1(u)
) ∈ Ql with
each user u ∈ U . Then the set Γ = {xu|u ∈ U} ⊂ Ql is a length l c-frameproof
code over Q of size n.
Proof. By deﬁnition Γ is a length l code over Q. There is a one-to-one corre-
spondence between users u ∈ U and words xu ∈ Γ since if there are two users
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u, v ∈ U with u 6= v but xu = xv then for each i = j, j+1, . . . , j+l−1 we have
Mi(u) = Mi(v). This implies that u is capable of creating a pirate broadcast
with marks Mi(u) = Mi(v) for all i = j, j + 1, . . . , j + l − 1 and hence fram-
ing v over the length l window starting at time j, thereby contradicting the
sequential c-frameproof property ofM. Thus we conclude that the number of
codewords in Γ is n.
We now proceed to prove that Γ is c-frameproof. Suppose there exists
a word xu ∈ Γ and set S ⊆ Γ with |S| ≤ c such that xu ∈ desc(S). Let
T ⊆ U be the set of users in U corresponding to the words of S. For each
i = j, j+1, . . . , j+ l− 1 we know that xiu = xiti for some ti ∈ T , which implies
that Mi(u) = Mi(ti). If the users of T decide to commit piracy, they have
the capacity to broadcast the segments with sequence of marks {Mi(ti)}li=1.
As these each agree with the marked segments given to u this contradicts the
sequential c-frameproof property of M unless u ∈ T . Hence we conclude that
u ∈ T and thus xu ∈ S. It follows that Γ is a c-frameproof code. 
We see therefore that the output of a sequential c-frameproof code over
any window of l consecutive time segments gives rise in a natural fashion to
an ordinary c-frameproof code. By Lemma 4.2 we know that we can construct
a sequential c-frameproof code by specifying its behaviour over the ﬁrst l
segments; this suggests that it may be possible to construct sequential c-
frameproof codes based on ordinary c-frameproof codes. Indeed this is the
case, and we describe this construction explicitly in the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. Suppose Γ = {x1, x2, . . . xn} ⊂ Ql is a c-frameproof code. We
define a function f cl : {1, 2, . . . , l} × U → Q, where U = {u1, u2, . . . un}, by
setting f cl (i, uj) = x
i
j for i = 1, 2, . . . , l and j = 1, 2, . . . , n. The function
M : N+×U → Q obtained by extending f cl as in Lemma 4.2 is an l-sequential
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c-frameproof code.
Proof. We prove this lemma by showing that the function f cl satisﬁes the
l-sequential c-frameproof condition over the ﬁrst l time segments; the result
then follows by Lemma 4.2. Suppose there exists a pirate set T ⊂ U with
|T | ≤ c capable of broadcasting segments with mark sequence {ξi}li=1 and
an innocent user uk ∈ U \ T with f cl (i, uk) = ξi for all i = 1, 2, . . . l. Let
S = {xj ∈ Γ|uj ∈ T}. For each i = 1, 2 . . . l,
xik = f
c
l (i, uk)
= ξi
= f cl (i, uj) for some uj ∈ T
= xiuj where xj ∈ S.
Hence the set S is capable of framing xk, which implies that xk ∈ S, and thus
uk ∈ T , thereby contradicting the assumption that uk ∈ U \ T . Therefore
no such T and uk exist, so f
c
l is sequential c-frameproof on the ﬁrst l time
segments, whence the associated M is an l-sequential c-frameproof code by
Lemma 4.2. 
Thus we see that known examples of c-frameproof codes can be eﬀectively
translated into the dynamic setting to yield sequential c-frameproof codes.
The following example illustrates how this works in practice.
Example 4.2 Example 2.4 contained a binary, length 3, 2-frameproof code Γ
with
Γ = {x0 = (0, 0, 0), x1 = (1, 1, 0), x2 = (0, 1, 1), x3 = (1, 0, 1)}.
As Γ contains four words, it can be turned into a 3-sequential 2-frameproof
code for four users. Let U = {u0, u1, u2, u3} and Q = {0, 1}. Deﬁne a
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function f 23 : N
+ × U → Q by setting f 23 (i, uj) = xi′j , where i′ ∈ {1, 2, 3}
and i′ ≡ i (mod 3). Using Lemma 4.2 we can extend f 23 to a 3-sequential
2-frameproof code M. The following table indicates how the marks would be
distributed according to M over the ﬁrst nine time segments.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
u0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
u1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
u2 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1
u3 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1
If we consider any three consecutive time segments we observe that the marks
received by each user correspond to words in Q3 that are either the words of Γ,
or a cyclic shift of those words. Such a shift does not aﬀect the 2-frameproof
property that Γ possesses therefore it is not possible for any two colluding
users to frame a third user over any length 3 window of consecutive segments.
Thus we conclude that M is indeed a 3-sequential 2-frameproof code. 
Theorems 4.3 and 4.4 provide us with a description of the structure of an
l-sequential c-frameproof code, namely that the sequences of marks distributed
to each user correspond to successive c-frameproof codes of length l. In the
codes constructed according to Theorem 4.4 the c-frameproof codes derived
from the various length l windows of the l-sequential c-frameproof code are
essentially all equivalent. This is not always true of the c-frameproof codes
arising from a sequential c-frameproof code, as the following example demon-
strates; however, sequential codes of this form beneﬁt from being easier to
describe and construct.
Example 4.3
1 2 3 4 5 6
u0 0 0 0 0 0 0 · · ·
u1 1 1 1 1 1 1 · · ·
u2 0 1 2 3 3 3 · · ·
u3 3 0 2 4 4 4 · · ·
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The table above shows the mark distribution over six time segments of a 5-ary,
3-sequential 2-frameproof code protecting four users. Inspection of the symbols
received by any two users over any three consecutive segments reveals that at
most one of these symbols is common to both users. Hence at least three
users are required to frame a fourth over three consecutive segments. The
2-frameproof code corresponding to the ﬁrst three segments has minimum
distance two and thus diﬀers from that corresponding to segments 4, 5 and 6,
which has a minimum distance of three. 
The fact that there is this close connection between sequential frameproof
codes and ordinary frameproof codes means that we can apply known re-
sults about ordinary frameproof codes to the case of the sequential frameproof
codes. In particular we are interested in ﬁnding the minimum l for which there
exists an l-sequential c-frameproof code protecting n users or, conversely, ﬁnd-
ing the maximum number of users that can be supported by an l-sequential
c-frameproof code. The connection with ordinary frameproof codes means
that bounds on the size of these codes lead directly to bounds on the number
of users supported by the corresponding sequential frameproof codes.
Example 4.4 Suppose we have an alphabet of size 5, and wish to construct an
l-sequential 4-frameproof code protecting sixteen users with as small a value of
l as possible. Construction 2.13 yields a q-ary c-frameproof code of cardinality
l(q− 1) provided that l ≤ c. Thus it is possible to construct a 5-ary, length 4,
4-frameproof code containing sixteen words, for example. This in turn gives
rise to a 5-ary 4-sequential 4-frameproof code protecting sixteen users. Fur-
thermore, by Theorem 2.12 there can be no 5-ary 3-sequential 4-frameproof
code protecting sixteen users, as we know that the maximum possible size
for a length 3, 4-frameproof code is 3(q − 1) = 12. Thus we see that the
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4-sequential 4-frameproof code derived via Construction 2.13 has the mini-
mum possible convergence time for a sequential 4-frameproof code protecting
sixteen users. 
In Section 2.3 we described the known bounds on the sizes of frameproof
codes. For many choices of parameter, however, precise bounds are still not
known. One case in which more-precise results are available is the case where
the number of traitors is not bounded; essentially this is equivalent to c being
equal to n− 1. In the following section we show how to construct l-sequential
(n− 1)-frameproof codes supporting an optimal number of users.
4.3 l-Sequential (n− 1)-Frameproof Codes
In the case where there is no restriction on the number of traitors (essen-
tially when c = n − 1) precise results are known about the maximal sizes
of c-frameproof codes. In what follows we describe the construction of a⌈
n
q−1
⌉
-sequential (n− 1)-frameproof code, and then use known bounds on the
size of the related ordinary (n−1)-frameproof codes to show that the resulting
code has the minimum possible convergence time given the number of users
and the alphabet size. We begin with a lemma that will be used to motivate
our construction.
Lemma 4.5. Let M : N+ × U → Q, (i, u) 7→ Mi(u), let u ∈ U and fix an
integer j ≥ 1. Suppose that for each i = j, j+1, . . . j+ l−1 there exists a user
ti ∈ U \ {u} with Mi(u) = Mi(ti). Then M is not an l-sequential frameproof
code.
Proof. Suppose T = {tj, tj+1, . . . , tj+l−1} is a pirate. Then T can broadcast the
sequence {ξi}j+l−1i=j with ξi =Mi(ti). But then for each i = j, j+1, . . . , j+ l−1
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we have Mi(u) = ξi; hence T can frame u, and thus M is not an l-sequential
l-frameproof code. This implies thatM is not an l-sequential frameproof code
either. 
Thus we see that in order for a mark distribution to be an l-sequential
frameproof code it is necessary for each user to receive a unique mark at some
time in every length l window, for otherwise they risk being framed. This re-
quirement gives rise to a natural construction of a sequential (n− 1)-frameproof
code.
Construction 4.6. Let Q = {0, 1, . . . q − 1}, and U = {u0, u1, . . . un−1}.
Define f⌈ nq−1⌉ : {1, 2, . . . ,
⌈
n
q−1
⌉} × U → Q by setting
f⌈ nq−1⌉(i, uj) =
{
j + 1− (q − 1)(i− 1) if (q − 1)(i− 1) ≤ j ≤ (q − 1)i− 1,
0 otherwise.
Extending f⌈ nq−1⌉ with the aid of lemma 4.2 to a function M results in a⌈
n
q−1
⌉
-sequential (n− 1)-frameproof code.
This description of f⌈ nq−1⌉ is perhaps deceptively complicated; it can be
more clearly illustrated by an example.
Example 4.5 Suppose you have ten users u0, u1, . . . , u9 and an alphabet
{0, 1, 2, 3}. Then ⌈ n
q−1
⌉
= 4, and the function f4 resulting from the above
construction distributes marks to the users as in the following table.
1 2 3 4
u0 1 0 0 0
u1 2 0 0 0
u2 3 0 0 0
u3 0 1 0 0
u4 0 2 0 0
u5 0 3 0 0
u6 0 0 1 0
u7 0 0 2 0
u8 0 0 3 0
u9 0 0 0 1
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We see that each user receives a unique mark in one of these four segments;
extending f4 to M will thus result in a mark distribution with the property
that every user receives a unique mark at some time during every length 4
window. 
Knowing that each user receives a unique mark in each window of length⌈
n
q−1
⌉
we see that M is indeed a ⌈ n
q−1
⌉
-sequential (n− 1)-frameproof code.
Proof. The function f⌈ nq−1⌉ allocates a unique mark to the ﬁrst q − 1 users
during the ﬁrst time segment, the next q−1 users during the second time seg-
ment and so on, until each user has received a unique mark at some time. This
procedure takes
⌈
n
q−1
⌉
time intervals; f⌈ nq−1⌉ is then extended to a sequential
frameproof code as usual. Since each user has been allocated a unique mark at
some time during every interval of
⌈
n
q−1
⌉
time segments no user can be framed
by a pirate coalition irrespective of its size. 
The above construction shows that for an l-sequential (n − 1)-frameproof
code protecting n users the minimum possible convergence time is at most⌈
n
q−1
⌉
. In order determine this minimum value exactly, we turn our consid-
eration to ordinary (n − 1)-frameproof codes. The (n − 1)-frameproof code
obtained from the sequential (n−1)-frameproof code above as in Theorem 4.3
corresponds to a subset of the (n− 1)-frameproof code given in Example 2.6.
Theorem 2.12 shows that there is no larger q-ary, length l, (n− 1)-frameproof
code, which leads us to the following theorem.
Theorem 4.7. The
⌈
n
q−1
⌉
-sequential (n − 1)-frameproof code of Construc-
tion 4.6 has an optimal convergence time, in the sense that there does not
exist a sequential (n − 1)-frameproof code protecting n users with a conver-
gence time less than
⌈
n
q−1
⌉
.
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Proof. Suppose there exists a
(⌈
n
q−1
⌉− 1)-sequential (n− 1)-frameproof code
protecting n users. The q-ary, length
⌈
n
q−1
⌉ − 1, (n − 1)-frameproof code
derived from the ﬁrst
⌈
n
q−1
⌉ − 1 time segments of the sequential code has
size n. According to Theorem 2.12, however, the maximum possible size of a
(n− 1)-frameproof code of these parameters is in fact
(⌈ n
q − 1
⌉
− 1
)
(q − 1) = (q − 1)
⌈ n
q − 1
⌉
− (q − 1)
< n+ (q − 1)− (q − 1)
= n.
This results in a contradiction, so our original supposition must be false. Thus
the smallest possible l for which there exists an l-sequential (n−1)-frameproof
code is
⌈
n
q−1
⌉
, hence the code resulting from Construction 4.6 has an optimal
convergence time. 
We have now seen several examples of how we can make use of the connec-
tion between sequential c-frameproof codes and ordinary c-frameproof codes.
Essentially we can regard sequential c-frameproof codes to be a useful new
manifestation of c-frameproof codes that enables their framing-preventing prop-
erties to be extended to the dynamic model. We have seen examples of choices
of parameters q, c and n for which we know the optimal convergence time l,
although in the majority of cases there is still a discrepancy between the best
known upper and lower bounds for the minimum possible l. In Chapter 3
we saw that dynamic traitor-tracing schemes proved to be considerably more
eﬃcient than sequential traitor-tracing schemes, which is to be expected given
the extra information available. In the context of framing protection it is not
unreasonable, therefore, to expect that dynamic schemes that make use of the
information contained in the pirate’s broadcast to prevent framing should be
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able to achieve shorter convergence times than even the best sequential frame-
proof codes. Indeed this is the case; such possibilities are explored in the two
subsequent chapters.
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Chapter 5
Dynamic Frameproof Codes
In Section 3.3 we saw how dynamic traitor-tracing schemes are capable of
catching traitors more quickly than the corresponding sequential traitor-tracing
schemes thanks to the ability to use the information provided by the pirate’s
broadcast in determining the mark distribution. In this chapter we show how
this information can be used in the prevention of framing. We give a deﬁnition
of l-dynamic frameproof codes that take l time segments to prevent framing
by any number of traitors, and we provide a construction that is optimal with
respect to the number of time segments required to implement it. We demon-
strate that for n users and an alphabet of size q an l-dynamic frameproof code
preventing framing by a coalition of up to c traitors exists for any c > 1 if and
only if n ≤ ql−1(q− 1), and that a similar code preventing framing by a single
traitor exists if and only if n ≤ ql.
5.1 Definitions
The dynamic setting diﬀers from the sequential case in that we wish in this
instance to make use of the information present in the pirate’s broadcast.
This should allow us to ﬁnd more-eﬃcient ways of distributing marks so as to
prevent framing.
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Suppose we have a set of users U = {u1, u2, . . . un} and a mark alphabet
Q of size q, and suppose there exists a pirate T = {t1, t2, . . . , tc} ⊂ U . We
wish to distribute marked segments as in the sequential case, only this time
our distribution of marks at a particular time may depend on a pirate’s pre-
vious broadcast. We assume that at any given time α we know the sequence
{ξj}α−1j=1 of marks previously broadcast by the pirate and we use this sequence
to determine how to allocate marks to the users. The pirate T responds by
broadcasting a marked segment received by one of the tj ∈ T ; this mark is
then taken into account when distributing the marks at time α+1, and so on.
Definition 5.1. A sequence {ξj}αj=1 is a valid pirate broadcast sequence for a
particular mark distribution if there exists a set T ⊂ U (the pirate) such that
for all i = 1, 2, . . . , α the mark ξi was received by some user t ∈ T and is not
a unique mark.
If the pirate broadcasts a unique mark we can take action against the
user who received that mark and remove them from the set of users, hence
weakening the pirate. As such a user is part of the guilty coalition they can
not be said to have been framed. In deﬁning dynamic frameproof codes we
consider only valid pirate broadcast sequences, which ensures that framing can
be prevented even when traitors do not incriminate themselves in this fashion.
For the sake of brevity we represent the pirate sequence {ξj}α−1j=1 by the word
Ξα = (ξ1, ξ2, . . . ξα−1) ∈ Qα−1.
Definition 5.2. An l-dynamic c-frameproof code is a finite family of functions
{Dα}lα=1 where D1 : U → Q and Dα : Qα−1 × U → Q for α > 1, with the
property that for any valid pirate broadcast sequence {ξj}lj=1 corresponding to
a pirate T with |T | ≤ c there is no user u ∈ U \ T with Dj(Ξj, u) = ξj for all
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j = 1, 2, . . . , l.
At time α > 1 the sequence of marks Ξα previously broadcast by the pirate
is used as an input to the function Dα in order to determine how the marked
segments are distributed among the users. Recall that at time α the pirate T
is capable of broadcasting precisely those marks in the set {Dα(Ξα, t)|t ∈ T}.
An l-dynamic frameproof code guarantees that no matter which of these marks
the pirate chooses to broadcast at each time α ≤ l once l segments have been
broadcast the pirate broadcast sequence will not match the sequence allocated
to any innocent user.
Example 5.1 If M is a q-ary l-sequential c-frameproof code for user set U
we can deﬁne a q-ary l-dynamic c-frameproof code by setting D1(u) = M1(u)
and Dα(Ξα, u) = Mα(u) for all u ∈ U and α = 2, . . . , l. 
An l-sequential c-frameproof code guarantees that no innocent user can be
framed over l time segments, and thus can be used as a dynamic frameproof
code. The use for the dynamic codes is somewhat diﬀerent from that of the
sequential frameproof codes, however. The latter, if used continuously, prevent
framing for any time intervals of length l or greater whereas the dynamic codes
are designed to be put into use over a speciﬁc interval once there is a suspicion
that framing is occurring. At this time the broadcaster starts to distribute
marks in a manner corresponding to a dynamic frameproof code with α set
to 1. If the broadcaster suspects framing is occuring the use of such a code
will prevent that framing from continuing. This is accomplished within a time
l which, to be of practical use, is less than that achieved by any sequential
frameproof code with the appropriate parameters. In Chapter 6 we go on to
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deﬁne sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes, which are perhaps more-
closely related to the l-sequential frameproof codes; their construction builds
on ideas obtained from the study of l-dynamic frameproof codes, however,
much as l-sequential frameproof codes were obtained from the functions f cl in
Section 4.1.
5.2 Construction of l-Dynamic Frameproof
Codes
In the case of sequential frameproof codes improved convergence times can
be achieved when the number of traitors is limited. In a dynamic situation,
however, we will see that once we suppose there is more than one traitor we
do not in fact gain anything by considering limits on the number of traitors:
two traitors can do as much damage as n− 1 traitors.
An l-dynamic frameproof code that uses an alphabet Q = {0, 1, . . . , q−1},
and works for users U = {u0, u1, . . . , un−1} and any number c < n of traitors
in time l =
⌈
logq
(⌈
n
q−1
⌉)⌉
+ 1 ≈ logq(n) is constructed as follows:
Construction 5.3. Let l =
⌈
logq
(⌈
n
q−1
⌉)⌉
+ 1; let Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1} and
U = {u0, u1, . . . un−1}. Denote by qji the jth digit in the q-ary expansion of the
integer i ≥ 0. We define functions D1 : U → Q and Dj : Qj−1 × U → Q for
2 ≤ j ≤ l − 1 as follows:
Dj(Ξj, ui) = q
j
i′ ,
where i′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . ⌈ n
q−1
⌉}
and i′ ≡ i (mod ⌈ n
q−1
⌉
).
This ensures that each q-ary sequence of length l − 1 will have been received
by up to q − 1 users over the first l − 1 time segments. At most q − 1 users
will have received sequences of marks matching the pirate broadcast sequence
Ξl = {ξi}l−1i=1; denote these users (if they exist) by w1, w2, . . . wq−1. We then
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define
Dl(Ξl, ui) =
{
x if ui = wx,
0 otherwise.
This ensures that any user whose sequence matches the pirate’s over the
ﬁrst l − 1 segments receives a unique symbol at time l. This is illustrated by
the following example.
Example 5.2 Suppose there are 18 users u0, u1, . . . , u17, and a mark alphabet
{0, 1, 2}. The following table shows how the marks are allocated to the users
according to the above construction, based on a particular pirate broadcast
sequence.
1 2 3
u0 0 0 1
u1 1 0 0
u2 2 0 0
u3 0 1 0
u4 1 1 0
u5 2 1 0
u6 0 2 0
u7 1 2 0
u8 2 2 0
u9 0 0 2
u10 1 0 0
u11 2 0 0
u12 0 1 0
u13 1 1 0
u14 2 1 0
u15 0 2 0
u16 1 2 0
u17 2 2 0
T 0 0 0
Users u0 and u9 have been framed over the ﬁrst two segments so at time
3 user u0 is given the symbol 1 and u9 the symbol 2 while all other users
receive 0. A valid pirate broadcast sequence for this distribution will satisfy
ξ3 = 0, therefore in this case the pirate broadcast sequence is 0, 0, 0, which
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does not correspond to the sequence received by any user. Hence framing has
not occurred.
This construction does not depend on the potential size of the pirate coali-
tion. If we compare the code of this example with the sequential frameproof
code resulting from Construction 4.6 we see that in the latter case 18
3−1 = 9 time
segments are required to prevent framing, instead of the log3
(
18
3−1
)
+ 1 = 3
required here. Thus the extra information available in the dynamic setting
allows us to prevent framing much more quickly than when using sequential
constructions. 
In the example framing was prevented in time
⌈
logq
(⌈
n
q−1
⌉)⌉
+ 1; we now
show that the construction indeed achieves this in general.
Theorem 5.4. The functions resulting from Construction 5.3 constitute an
l-dynamic c-frameproof code for any c ≥ 0.
Proof. By the construction of Dl any user whose sequence matched the pirate
broadcast over the ﬁrst l − 1 segments (i.e. any user who was framed over
that time) is given a unique mark at time l. For any valid pirate broadcast
sequence none of these users’ received marks matches the pirate’s at time l,
thus there is no user who is framed over the entire interval. The functions
deﬁned in this construction hence constitute a
(⌈
logq
(⌈
n
q−1
⌉)⌉
+ 1
)
-dynamic
c-frameproof code for any c ≥ 0, as the construction is independent of the
value of c. 
If the number of users is n = qk(q − 1) then the convergence time of the
code yielded by this construction is l = k + 1. This is in fact optimal for this
number of users, a result which is a corollary of the following lemma.
Lemma 5.5. Let k ≥ 1, q ≥ 2. A (k + 1)-dynamic 2-frameproof code that
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protects n users from framing using an alphabet of size q exists if and only if
n ≤ qk(q − 1).
Proof. In the case where n ≤ qk(q − 1) the existence of a (k + 1)-dynamic
2-frameproof code is demonstrated by Construction 5.3. To prove the converse
we use induction on k.
Let P (k) be the proposition that the existence of a q-ary (k + 1)-dynamic
2-frameproof code protecting n users implies n ≤ qk(q − 1).
We prove P (1) is true: suppose the number of users is greater than q(q−1).
By the pigeon-hole principle there exists some set S of at least q users who
receive the same marked segment during the ﬁrst time interval. As we have
q(q−1) users but our alphabet only has q marks, some user u ∈ S will receive
the same marked segment as some other user t2 (not necessarily in S) during
the second time interval. Let t1 ∈ S \ {u}, but note that t1 and t2 are not
necessarily distinct. Then the sequence D1(t1), D2(D1(t1), t2) is a valid pirate
broadcast sequence for the pirate T = {t1, t2}, which can thus frame u /∈ T as
D1(u) = D1(t1) and D2(D1(t1), u) = D2(D1(t1), t2). Therefore no matter how
the functions D1 and D2 allocate the marks it is impossible to guarantee that
framing will not occur when n > q(q − 1). Hence P (1) is true.
Assume that P (j) is true for some j, then each (j+1)-dynamic 2-frameproof
code requires the number of users to be less than or equal to qj(q − 1). Sup-
pose there exists a (j +2)-dynamic 2-frameproof code {Dα}j+2α=1 for more than
qj+1(q − 1) users and an alphabet of size q. Then there is some subset S of
users who will be given the same marked segment m during the ﬁrst time
interval, with |S| > qj(q − 1). After this time interval, deﬁne a new family
of functions {Eγ}j+1γ=1 with E1 : S → Q and Eγ : Qγ−1 × S → U by setting
Eγ(Ξ¯γ, u) = Dγ+1|S(Ξγ+1, u), where if Ξγ+1 is the sequence m, ξ2, ξ3, . . . , ξγ+1
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then Ξ¯γ is the sequence ξ2, ξ3, . . . , ξγ+1. We claim that the family of functions
{Eγ}j+1γ=1 is a (j + 1)-dynamic 2-frameproof code for user set S, for otherwise
there exists a valid pirate broadcast sequence {ξ2, ξ3, . . . ξj+2} corresponding
to a pirate set T with |T | ≤ 2, and some user u ∈ S \ T with E1(u) = ξ2
and Ei(ξ2, ξ3, . . . , ξi, u) = ξi+1 for i = 2, 3, . . . j + 1. As the members of T are
in S then during the ﬁrst segment they must have received the symbol m,
as did user u. Hence the pirate T is capable of framing user u over all time
segments from t = 1 to j + 2. This contradicts the assumption that {Dα}j+2α=1
is (j + 2)-dynamic 2-frameproof. Thus we conclude that {Eγ}j+1γ=1 is in fact
(j + 1)-dynamic 2-frameproof. However S has more than qj(q − 1) members,
which contradicts our inductive assumption. Hence P (j) ⇒ P (j + 1), and
therefore P (k) is true for all k ≥ 1. 
Construction 5.3 demonstrates the existence of a (k + 1)-dynamic frame-
proof code protecting qk(q−1) users from any number 1 ≤ c ≤ n−1 of traitors.
By the above lemma we see that a (k + 1)-dynamic c-frameproof code exists
only if n ≤ qk−1(q − 1) for any c with 2 ≤ c ≤ n − 1. Hence we obtain the
following theorem.
Theorem 5.6. An l-dynamic c-frameproof code protecting n users with c > 1
exists if and only if n ≤ ql−1(q − 1).
If the number of users exceeds qk−1(q − 1) the convergence time must be
at least k + 1, from which we deduce:
Corollary 5.7. The convergence time of the code resulting from Construc-
tion 5.3 is optimal for the given number of users and alphabet size.
The case where there is known to be precisely one traitor diﬀers slightly.
In this situation a pirate is some user t, who can only frame an innocent
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user u if they have received the same sequences, so Di(t) = Di(Ξi, u) for all
i = 1, 2, . . . l. From this we deduce the following theorem.
Theorem 5.8. A q-ary l-dynamic 1-frameproof code protecting n users exists
if and only if n ≤ ql.
Proof. If the marked segments are distributed so that each user receives a dis-
tinct sequence of l symbols then no user can frame another. There are exactly
ql length l sequences with symbols from an alphabet of size q; if there are ql
users it is therefore possible to allocate a unique sequence to each user. This
demonstrates the existence of q-ary l-dynamic 1-frameproof codes protecting
ql users.
Now suppose that the number of users is at least ql + 1. At time 1 sup-
pose the pirate broadcasts the symbol that was received by the largest num-
ber of users. Denote the set of users receiving this symbol by S1. Then
|S1| ≥
⌈
ql+1
q
⌉
= ql−1 + 1 (for l ≥ 1). Suppose that at time 2 the pirate broad-
casts the symbol received by the largest number of users in set S1. Denote by
S2 the set of users whose received sequence corresponds with the pirate broad-
cast over the ﬁrst two segments. Then |S2| ≥ ql−2+1. Repeating this process,
at time l − 1 there is a set Sl−1 of size q + 1 whose sequences correspond to
the pirate broadcast over the ﬁrst l time segments. At time l, therefore, two
of the users in Sl−1 receive the same mark. If the pirate broadcasts this mark
at this time it follows that either of these users is capable of having produced
the entire pirate broadcast, so that one of them may be the pirate who has
thus framed the other user. Thus we claim that when the number of users
exceeds ql it is impossible to guarantee that a single traitor will not frame an
innocent user. 
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Chapter 6
Sliding-Window Dynamic
Frameproof Codes
In this chapter we undertake to apply the extra information provided in the dy-
namic setting to create schemes similar to the sequential frameproof codes but
having shorter convergence times; sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes
are the result. We start by observing that such schemes can be constructed
from dynamic frameproof codes and provide a bound on the convergence time
that is tight for certain numbers of users. After giving a new construction
for these schemes we then restrict our attention to schemes using a binary
alphabet, and describe another construction which provides a model that is
exploited by later constructions. We discuss a suﬃcient condition for a mark
distribution to constitute a sliding-window l-dynamic framproof code and de-
rive a bound on the convergence time of schemes satisfying this condition,
showing that it is tight in many cases. This is followed by an examination
of a geometric model that facilitates the study of a particular class of these
schemes; ﬁnally, we determine a bound on the convergence times of schemes
constructed geometrically.
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6.1 The Sliding-Window Model
The dynamic frameproof codes described in the previous chapter can be used
to prevent framing over one particular length l window. Sequential frameproof
codes, on the other hand, have the property that they can be applied contin-
uously to ensure protection from framing over any window of l consecutive
time segments; we refer to this as the sliding-window model. This diﬀerence
between the sequential and dynamic frameproof codes reﬂects a diﬀerence in
how they might be used: a sequential frameproof code can be used throughout
the broadcast and the broadcaster can be conﬁdent that framing will not occur,
whereas a dynamic frameproof code may be applied at a particular time once
the broadcaster suspects that framing is occurring. Using a dynamic frame-
proof code from time t to time t+ l−1 the broadcaster can reassure each user
that he or she will not have been framed over this time interval; this is perhaps
not so useful if the pirate simply decides instead to frame some user from time
t+1 onwards. The main diﬀerence in the construction of dynamic frameproof
codes compared with schemes that work in the sliding-window model is that in
the latter case the broadcaster does not know in advance over which interval
the pirate might frame some user. The dynamic frameproof codes described
in the previous chapter will no longer protect all users if the ﬁrst segment over
which they are applied is ignored, whereas a sliding-window frameproof code
will not only protect users from being framed from time t to t+ l−1, but also
from time t+ 1 to t+ l and so on.
Example 6.1 Suppose U = {u0, u1, u2, u3} and Q = {0, 1} and let l = 3. The
following table shows a potential mark distribution and pirate broadcast over
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ﬁve time segments with a dynamic frameproof code resulting from Construc-
tion 5.3 applied over the ﬁrst three.
1 2 3 4 5
u0 0 0 1 0 0
u1 0 1 0 0 1
u2 1 0 0 1 0
u3 1 1 0 1 1
T 0 0 0 1 0
The use of a dynamic frameproof code prevents framing over the ﬁrst three
segments; however, the pirate is able to frame user u2 over segments 2 to 5,
indicating that this mark distribution does not prevent framing in the sliding-
window model. 
So far we have seen sequential frameproof codes that work in the sliding-
window model and dynamic frameproof codes that do not. It would be ad-
vantageous if we could use the dynamic setting to create schemes oﬀering
sliding-window frameproof protection but having shorter convergence times
(i.e. having shorter window length l) than sequential codes; it is not immedi-
ately clear that this is possible, however. Consider an l-dynamic c-frameproof
code. In an analogue to Lemma 4.2 it can be applied repeatedly starting at
times 1, l+1, 2l+1 and so on. This will ensure that framing cannot occur over
any 2l − 1 consecutive time segments, since a time interval of that size nec-
essarily includes one complete application of the code. Hence sliding-window
functionality is acheived. The following example shows that greatly improved
convergence times can be obtained by such methods.
Example 6.2 Suppose there are 2× 310 users (slightly more than 105 users),
and you wish to use an alphabet of size three to prevent framing by any num-
ber of traitors. Construction 4.6 results in a ternary l-sequential frameproof
code with l = 310. Construction 5.3, however, yields an l-dynamic frameproof
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code with l = 11. As per the argument above applying this code repeatedly
enables the prevention of framing over any intervals of length 2l − 1 = 21.
Thus we see that making use of the information in the pirate broadcast se-
quence can allow us to continually prevent framing much more eﬃciently for
a given alphabet size. 
In order to further explore this idea we introduce the concept of a sliding-
window l-dynamic frameproof code.
Definition 6.1. A sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code is a countable
family of functions {Dα}∞α=1 where D1 : U → Q and Dα : Qα−1 × U → Q for
α > 1 with the property that for any valid pirate broadcast sequence {ξj}αj=1
corresponding to a pirate T there is no legitimate user u ∈ U \ T and time
i ≤ α− l with Dj(Ξj, u) = ξj for all j = i, i+ 1, . . . i+ l − 1.
A sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code therefore prevents each user
from being framed over any window of l consecutive time segments. The
code described in the above example, which protects qk(q− 1) users, is thus a
sliding-window (2k + 1)-dynamic frameproof code.
As in the case of sequential codes we refer to l as the convergence time
of the code. It would be natural to wonder what is the smallest convergence
time lq,n for which a sliding-window lq,n-dynamic frameproof code exists for
an alphabet of size q and user set U with |U | = n. The above discussion
implies that lq,qk(q−1) ≤ 2k+1. Furthermore, since restricting a sliding-window
lq,qk(q−1)-dynamic frameproof code to the ﬁrst lq,qk(q−1) time intervals gives an
ordinary lq,qk(q−1)-dynamic frameproof code, we have that
lq,qk(q−1) ≥ k + 1.
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We show in Theorem 6.2 that this bound can be improved to lq,qk(q−1) ≥ k + 2.
This is tight when k = 1 and hence lq,q(q−1) = 3, as shown in Corollary 6.3.
Theorem 6.2. Let q ≥ 2. If there exists a q-ary sliding-window l-dynamic
frameproof code protecting qk(q − 1) users then
l ≥ k + 2.
Proof. We know that l ≥ k + 1. Suppose {Dα}∞α=1 is a sliding-window
(k + 1)-dynamic frameproof code protecting n = qk(q − 1) users. We refer
to a segment in which at least one user receives a mark not received by any
other user at that time as a protection segment. Suppose that at each time
t prior to the ﬁrst protection segment the pirate broadcast consists of the
marked segment that ensures that the greatest possible number of users have
been framed over segments 1 to t. Then the ﬁrst protection segment must oc-
cur within the ﬁrst l segments, or else at least one user will have been framed
over this time, as in the proof of Lemma 4.5.
Suppose that the ﬁrst protection segment occurs at some time j0 and sup-
pose the pirate broadcast at this time is the symbol ξj0 received by the greatest
number of users at this time. Denote the set of users who received this symbol
by S0, and let h0 = |S0| ≥
⌈
n−1
q−1
⌉
= qk. At time j0 + 1 there exists a mark
ξj0+1 received by at least h1 =
⌈
h0
q
⌉ ≥ qk−1 users; denote the set of such users
by S1 and suppose the pirate broadcast at this time consists of this mark.
Continuing in this manner we ﬁnd that at time j0 + k − 1 there are hk−1 ≥ q
users who have been framed over the k segments from j0 to j0 + k − 1. As
the number of users is greater than k, at least one user u ∈ Sk−1 will receive
a mark at time j0 + k that has been received by some other user t1; suppose
the pirate broadcast at this time consists of this mark. Also, there exists a
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user t2 ∈ Sk−1 \ {u}, not necessarily distinct from t1. The set T = {t1, t2}
is capable of having produced the pirate broadcast from time j0 to jk and
thereby framing u over this period. We note further that the set T ′ = U \ {u}
is capable of having produced the entire broadcast from time 0 to j0+k, since
the fact that no segment prior to j0 was a protection segment implies that
each mark broadcast by the pirate was received by at least one user in T ′,
as |T ′| = n − 1. Thus for any sliding-window (k + 1)-dynamic frameproof
code protecting qk(q − 1) users there exists a pirate T ′ capable of framing a
user u /∈ T ′ over some window of k + 1 consecutive time segments, which is
a contradiction. Hence we conclude that for any sliding-window l-dynamic
frameproof code protecting qk(q − 1) users we require l ≥ k + 2. 
In the case where k = 1, Theorem 6.2 allows us to determine the exact
value of lq,qk(q−1).
Corollary 6.3. Suppose q > 2. Then
lq,q(q−1) = 3.
Proof. We know that k + 2 ≤ lq,q(q−1) ≤ 2k + 1 by the intial observations of
this section and by Theorem 6.2, but for k = 1 we have k+2 = 2k+1 = 3. 
For k > 1, however, there is still a discrepancy between the upper and
lower bounds for lq,qk(q−1). The following new construction requires q > 2
but yields a convergence time lq,n = ⌈logq−1(n)⌉ + 1, which results in a re-
duction of the upper bound for lq,qk(q−1) when k >
1
2−logq−1 q , since we have
that ⌈logq−1(qk(q − 1))⌉+ 1 < 2k + 1 if ⌈logq−1(qk)⌉ < 2k − 1. This holds if
⌈logq−1 q⌉ < 2− 1k , thus k > 12−logq−1 q .
Now logq−1 q is a decreasing function when q > 2 and approaches a limit
of 1 as q → ∞; we observe that 1
2−log2 3 ≈ 2.41 and that
1
2−logq−1 q approaches
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1 as q → ∞. Hence we conclude that for k > 2 Construction 6.4 leads to a
bound on lq,qk(q−1) that is an improvement on that arising from Example 6.2.
Construction 6.4. Suppose q > 2 and let Q = {0, 1, . . . q − 2} ∪ {∞} and
U = {u0, u1, . . . un−1}. Let l = ⌈logq−1(n)⌉ + 1. Denote by qji the jth digit in
the (q−1)-ary expansion of the integer i ≥ 0. We define functions D1 : U → Q
and Dj : Q
j−1 × U → Q for j > 1 as follows:
D1(ui) = q
1
i
Dj(ui) =


∞ if Dα(Ξα, ui) = ξα for all α = j − l + 1, j − l + 2, . . . j − 1,
qj
′
i otherwise, where j
′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l − 1}
and j′ ≡ j (mod l − 1).
When this construction is used, a user ui receives the l − 1 digits of the
(q − 1)-ary expansion of the integer i repeatedly, unless that user has been
framed over the l − 1 previous segments, in which case he or she receives the
protection symbol ∞. This is illustrated in the following example.
Example 6.3
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
u0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
u1 0 1 ∞ 1 0 1 0 1 0
u2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0 2 0
u3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0 3 0
u4 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1
u5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ∞ 1
u6 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
u7 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1
u8 2 0 2 0 2 ∞ 2 0 2
u9 2 1 2 1 2 1 ∞ 1 2
u10 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
u11 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2
u12 3 0 3 0 ∞ 0 3 0 3
u13 3 1 3 ∞ 3 1 3 1 3
u14 3 2 3 2 3 2 3 2 3
u15 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
T 0 1 3 0 2 1 1 1 0
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Suppose there are sixteen users u0, . . . u15, and an alphabet Q = {0, 1, 2, 3,∞}.
The table above demonstrates how marks are allocated by the functions con-
structed above over the ﬁrst nine time intervals based on a particular example
of a sequence broadcast by some pirate.
For q = 5 and n = 16 we have ⌈logq−1(n)⌉ + 1 = 3. The symbol ∞ is
broadcast whenever a user has been framed over consecutive time intervals. 
The functions arising from Construction 6.4 deﬁne a q-ary sliding-window
(⌈logq−1(n)⌉+1)-dynamic frameproof code. To prove this we need the following
lemma.
Lemma 6.5. If marks {0, 1, . . . , q−2}∪{∞} are allocated to n users according
to the functions defined in Construction 6.4 then at every time i ≥ 1 at most
one user receives the symbol ∞.
Proof. We use strong induction on i. As before, we let l = ⌈logq−1(n)⌉+ 1.
Let P (i) be the proposition that at time i at most one user receives the
symbol ∞.
Then P (i) is true for i = 1, 2, . . . , l since no user receives the symbol ∞ in
the ﬁrst l−1 time segments; during this time the user ui receives the sequence
of numbers corresponding to the (q − 1)-ary expansion of i. As such, no two
users have received the same sequence of marks over the ﬁrst l time intervals.
This implies that at most one user has received a sequence corresponding to
that broadcast by the pirate; such a user receives ∞ at time l and the others
all receive the ﬁrst number of their (q − 1)-ary expansion.
Assume P (h−l+2), P (h−l+3), . . . , P (h) are true. If the pirate broadcasts
∞ at some time between h − l + 2 and h no innocent user is framed at that
time, hence no user receives ∞ at time h+ 1.
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We now assume that the pirate has not broadcast ∞ at any time during that
interval. Any user who has received ∞ during that time can not be framed
over time h− l+ 2, h− l+ 3, . . . , h and thus will not receive ∞ at time h+1.
Any user ui who did not receive ∞ at any time during that interval received
a cyclic shift of the (q − 1)-ary expansion of i. No two users have the same
such expansion, thus at most one user has received a sequence corresponding
to that broadcast by the pirate, and hence receives ∞ at time h + 1.
Thus P (h− l+ 2), P (h− l + 3), . . . , P (h)⇒ P (h+ 1), and so P (i) is true
for all i ≥ 1. 
We are now in a position to prove the desired result.
Theorem 6.6. The functions defined in Construction 6.4 constitute a sliding-
window (⌈logq−1(n)⌉+ 1)-dynamic frameproof code.
Proof. Suppose that between times i and i + ⌈logq−1(n)⌉ there exists a set
S of users who receive sequences of marks equal to those broadcast by the
pirate. By the deﬁnition of Di+⌈logq−1(n)⌉+1 these users receive symbol ∞ at
time i + ⌈logq−1(n)⌉ + 1; by Lemma 6.5 there is at most one user in S. No
user in U \ S can be framed over the interval from i to i + ⌈logq−1(n)⌉ + 1;
assume therefore that there exists a user u ∈ S. At time i + ⌈logq−1(n)⌉ + 1
the user u receives the symbol ∞. As no other user receives this symbol at
this time it is impossible for u to be framed by any pirate coalition of which
it is not a member over the time interval i to i+ ⌈logq−1(n)⌉ + 1. Hence our
functions deﬁne a sliding-window (⌈logq−1(n)⌉+ 1)-dynamic frameproof code,
as required. 
We now turn our attention to the binary case in an eﬀort to determine
some more-precise bounds.
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6.2 The Binary Case
When one considers sliding-window dynamic frameproof codes over binary
alphabets it becomes apparent that the situation is slightly diﬀerent from
that of general q: Construction 6.4 can no longer be used, for instance. By
restricting our attention to this case, however, we obtain new bounds for the
minimum convergence time. We also provide examples of constructions whose
properties will be exploited by later more-general constructions.
When there are 2k users the repeated use of a k + 1-dynamic frameproof
code as in Example 6.2 yields a sliding-window (2k + 1)-dynamic frameproof
code. We can, however, do better than this: the following construction pro-
vides an example of a sliding-window 2k-dynamic frameproof code.
Construction 6.7. Let Q = {0, 1} and U = {u0, u1, . . . u2k−1}, for some
k ≥ 4. Denote by bγi the γ′th bit in the binary expansion of the integer i where
γ′ ≡ γ (mod k) and γ′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}. At each time segment marks will be
distributed in one of two ways: either at most one user will receive the mark
1 and all others will receive 0, or exactly half the users will receive 1 and half
0. A time segment in which precisely one user receives a 1 will be known as a
protection segment, as this distribution protects the user receiving the 1 from
being framed; the segments in which half the users receive 1 will be referred to
as ordinary segments.
We define functions D1 : U → Q and Dj : Qj−1 × U → Q for j > 1 by
setting
D1(ui) = b
1
i ,
and, for j > 1, by setting
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Dj(Ξj , ui) =


bγi if (k − 1) ∤ j, where ui received bγ−1i in the last
ordinary segment.
1 if (k − 1)|j and ui has been framed over the
previous k ordinary segments.
0 otherwise.
Essentially what happens is that a user ui repeatedly receives the sequence
of 0s and 1s corresponding to the binary representation of i, except that at
each time j where j is a multiple of k−1 he receives a 1 if he has been framed
over the previous k ordinary segments (those segments in which he is receiving
the bits of his binary expansion), and a 0 otherwise. As there are 2k users each
user thus corresponds to a unique k-bit binary number, so over the course of k
non-protection segments precisely one user will have a sequence corresponding
to the pirate broadcast and hence be framed. This ensures that when k − 1
divides j, exactly one user will receive the bit 1, thus these segments are pro-
tection segments.
Example 6.4 Suppose there are sixteen users u0, u1, . . . , u15, and an alphabet
Q = {0, 1}. The table below demonstrates how marks are allocated accord-
ing to the above construction over the ﬁrst twelve time intervals based on a
particular example of a sequence broadcast by some pirate T .
In this example, time segments 6, 9 and 12 are protection segments with
users u4, u7 and u3 respectively being protected. The remaining segments are
ordinary segments, except for segment 3, in which no user is protected since
no user has yet been framed for k = 4 sections. The time interval from 1 to 12
includes ﬁve windows of length 2k = 8: those starting at times 1, 2, 3, 4 and
5. Inspection shows that the pirate sequence over any of these windows does
72
not match that received by any user.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
u0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
u1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
u2 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
u3 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1
u4 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
u5 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
u6 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0
u7 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0
u8 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
u9 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
u10 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0
u11 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0
u12 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
u13 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 0
u14 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0
u15 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0
T 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0

In fact this property illustrated above is true in general: for any k the code
resulting from the above construction is sliding-window 2k-dynamic frame-
proof, as shown by the following theorem.
Theorem 6.8. The functions defined in Construction 6.7 constitute a sliding-
window 2k-dynamic frameproof code.
Proof. Let I be any time interval of length 2k. For k ≥ 4 we have ⌊ 2k
k−1⌋ = 2
and ⌈ 2k
k−1⌉ = 3 so there will be either two or three protection segments occur-
ring during time interval I. Denote by t the last protection segment occurring
within I. In the case where there are three protection segments, I must contain
a sequence of a protection segment followed by k−2 non-protection segments,
another protection segment, k − 2 more non-protection segments and then
segment t. Since k ≥ 4 it follows that 2(k − 2) ≥ k, so the k non-protection
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segments preceding t all lie within I. Similarly, if I contains two protection
segments we know that t must occur within the last k − 1 segments of I and
hence is preceded by at least k + 1 segments of I, at most one of which is
a protection segment. Thus in this case too, the k non-protection segments
preceding t lie within I. Let S be the set of time segments consisting of t and
the k non-protection segments preceding t. During those k segments a user
ui receives a cyclic shift of the bits in the binary expansion of i; each user
thus receives a unique sequence over these k segments, and hence one user
will have a sequence corresponding to that broadcast by the pirate. That user
will be the only user to receive the symbol 1 in segment t, and hence cannot
be framed by any coalition of other users at that segment. Therefore it is
impossible for a pirate coalition to frame any user on every time segment in
S. Since S is a subset of the interval I we can therefore conclude that no user
can be framed over the interval I. Since this is true for any length 2k time in-
terval I we can conclude that our functions do indeed deﬁne a sliding-window
2k-dynamic frameproof code. 
Construction 6.7 uses regularly-spaced protection segments to construct a
sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code with at least two protection seg-
ments in every length l time interval. It is natural to wonder whether a scheme
using more protection segments per interval could produce codes with smaller
values of l. Indeed this is the case, as will be demonstrated in the subse-
quent discussion. But ﬁrst it pays to consider more closely the properties of
the above construction. The method of allocating marks leads to each seg-
ment being either a protection segment or an ordinary segment. Any dynamic
frameproof code must make use of protection segments as otherwise there will
exist pirate sets capable of framing some user indeﬁnitely (cf. Lemma 4.5).
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Ordinary segments do not eliminate framing altogether, rather they can serve
to restrict the size of the set of users who are framed over a particular in-
terval. Assigning binary sequences to each user as in Construction 6.7 allows
you to halve the size of such a set with each ordinary segment; when a binary
alphabet is used this is the best reduction that can be guaranteed in a single
segment.
The proof that the code produced in Construction 6.7 is indeed sliding-
window 2k-dynamic frameproof relies on the fact that each length 2k time
interval contains some protection segment t and the k preceding ordinary
segments. This condition is suﬃcient for constructions of this type to yield
sliding-window dynamic frameproof codes. We show in Theorem 6.10 that in
order for this condition to hold it is necessary that l ≥ k+⌈2√k⌉. This theorem
is expressed in terms of sequences of zeros and ones, with 1 representing a
protection segment, and 0 an ordinary segment. Its proof makes use of the
following lemma.
Lemma 6.9. Let l, k, b ∈ N with k < l < k + 2√k and b < l − k. Then⌈
k
l−k−b
⌉
> b.
Proof. Consider b2 − (l − k)b + k to be a quadratic in b. It is positive
deﬁnite when the discriminant is less than 0, which occurs when we have
(l − k)2 − 4k = l2 − 2kl + k2 − 4k < 0. Considering the discriminant to be
a quadratic in l we ﬁnd it has zeros
2k±
√
4k2−4(k2−4k)
2
= k ± 2√k, thus for
k < l < k + 2
√
k the discriminant is negative. So b2 − (l − k)b + k > 0, and
we deduce that k
l−k−b > b, as l − k − b > 0. 
Theorem 6.10. Let {xi}∞i=1 where xi ∈ {0, 1} be a sequence with the property
that every window of l consecutive elements contains at least one 1 and at least
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k 0s before the final 1 in that window. Then l ≥ k + ⌈2√k⌉.
Proof. Suppose there exists a sequence S = {xi}∞i=1 satisfying the above prop-
erty for l ≤ k+⌈2√k⌉−1 (we note that this implies l < k+2√k, and that triv-
ially l ≥ k+1). Consider a window {xi, xi+1, . . . , xi+l−1} with i > l(⌈2
√
k⌉−1)
that ends with b consecutive 0s for some b ≥ 1 (such windows necessarily ex-
ist). If b ≥ ⌈2√k⌉− 1 there are not enough elements remaining in the window
to satisfy the desired property, hence we can assume b < ⌈2√k⌉ − 1. The
remaining l − b elements of the window must include at least k further 0s,
hence the window contains at most l − k − b 1s. By the pigeon-hole principle
one of these 1s must be preceded by at least b1 =
⌈
k
l−k−b
⌉
0s, hence we can
ﬁnd another window ending in b1 0s, and b1 > b by Lemma 6.9. By repeating
this process up to ⌈2√k⌉ − 2 times we ﬁnd there must exist a window ending
in ⌈2√k⌉ − 1 0s; such a window does not have enough remaining elements
to allow the desired property to be satisﬁed, thus our original assumption is
contradicted. 
This result implies that in order for every window of a sliding-window l-
dynamic frameproof code to contain at least one protection segment with k
ordinary segments occurring prior to the ﬁnal protection segment we require
l ≥ k + ⌈2√k⌉.
The following construction, which parallels Construction 6.7 but requires k
to be a square, results in a code satisfying the above condition with l = k + 2
√
k,
which is thus a sliding-window (k+2
√
k)-dynamic frameproof code. This im-
plies that for k square the codes resulting from this construction are optimal in
the sense of having the smallest convergence time possible for codes satisfying
that condition; the bound of Theorem 6.10 is therefore tight in this case.
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Construction 6.11. Let k be a square, let Q = {0, 1} and let the set of users
be U = {u0, u1, . . . u2k−1}. As before denote by bγi the γ′th bit in the binary
expansion of the integer i ≥ 0 where γ ≡ γ′ (mod k) and γ′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}.
We define functions D1 : U → Q and Dj : Qj−1×U → Q for j > 1 as follows:
D1(ui) = b
1
i
Dj(Ξj , ui) =


bγi if (
√
k + 1) ∤ j, where ui received mark b
γ−1
i
in the previous ordinary segment.
1 if (
√
k + 1) | j and ui has been framed over
the previous k ordinary segments.
0 otherwise.
In an analogue of Construction 6.7, every (
√
k + 1)th segment will be a
protection segment, and all the others will be ordinary segments. In intervals
with
√
k+1 protection segments the ﬁnal protection segment must be preceded
by at least
√
k × √k = k non-protection segments, and in intervals with √k
protection segments the ﬁnal one must be preceded by at least
(
√
k − 1)
√
k + (l − (
√
k − 1)
√
k −
√
k −
√
k) = (
√
k − 1)
√
k +
√
k
= k
non-protection segments. We can then apply the proof of Theorem 6.8 mutatis
mutandis to show that Construction 6.11 really does aﬀord a sliding-window
(k + 2
√
k)-dynamic frameproof code.
Example 6.5 In the case where k = 4 we have that
√
k+1 = k− 1. As such,
the code resulting from this construction will be identical to that illustrated
in Example 6.4. 
Hence we now have a suﬃcient condition for codes to be sliding-window
l-dynamic frameproof that implies the bound l ≥ ⌈k + 2√k⌉, which is tight
77
at least when k is a square. It is certainly not a necessary condition, how-
ever: for q = 2 and |U | = 2k the code resulting from Construction 4.6 can
be thought of as a sliding-window 2k-dynamic frameproof code, yet for this
code every segment is a protection segment and hence the given condition is
not fulﬁlled. Therefore we would like to know whether in general there exist
sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes not satisfying this condition that
achieve l < k + 2
√
k. We begin by turning our attention to a particular class
of codes, those given by a geometric construction, and show that for these
codes there is not much room for improvement, with l required to be greater
than or equal to k + ⌈2√k⌉ − 1 (see Theorem 6.17).
6.2.1 Geometric Constructions
In preceding sections we have given deﬁnitions for dynamic and sliding-window
dynamic frameproof codes, as well as constructions of such codes. In what
follows we consider examples of these codes that can be given by geometric
constructions. The geometric setting has the advantage that it is frequently
easier to visualise the structures involved, which can lead to simpler argu-
ments. These are not the most general constructions possible but in subse-
quent sections we will make use of results obtained in studying them. Our
aim in this section is to show that geometric codes protecting 2k users require
l ≥ k + ⌈2√k⌉ − 1; we ﬁrst present some results analogous to those of prior
sections in order to introduce the geometric notation.
Suppose there is a set U of 2k users. We can then associate with each
user one of the 2k points of the k-dimensional aﬃne space AG(k, 2) obtained
by removing a hyperplane Σ∞ of the k-dimensional projective space PG(k, 2).
Denote by Pu the point of AG(k, 2) associated with the user u ∈ U .
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The hyperplanes of AG(k, 2) (i.e. the intersections of AG(k, 2) with hy-
perplanes of PG(k, 2) other than Σ∞) fall into 2k − 1 parallel classes, with
two hyperplanes in each class. Specifying a hyperplane in a particular paral-
lel class partitions the set of users into two subsets of size 2k−1: those users
corresponding to points in that hyperplane, and those whose points fall in the
other hyperplane of that parallel class.
We can use geometric ideas to construct optimal dynamic frameproof codes
as follows:
Construction 6.12. In PG(k, 2) it is possible to find a set of k + 1 linearly-
independent hyperplanes, Σ∞,Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σk say.
We define functions Dα for α = 1, 2, . . . , k by
Dα(u) =
{
1 if u ∈ Σα,
0 otherwise.
We also define a function Dk+1 that depends on the pirate broadcast sequence
{ξi}ki=1 where ξi ∈ GF (2). Consider the set S = {Σ′1,Σ′2, . . . ,Σ′k}, where
Σ′i = Σi if ξi = 1 and Σ
′
i = Σ
par
i , the hyperplane parallel to Σi, if ξi = 0. For
each i we have Σpari = Σi+Σ∞ as these three hyperplanes form a pencil about
a secundum. Thus the k hyperplanes in S are linearly-independent and will
therefore intersect in a unique point P . We then define Dk+1 by:
Dk+1(Ξk+1, u) =
{
1 if Pu = P ,
0 otherwise.
The user P is the unique user whose allotted marks correspond to the pi-
rate broadcast sequence over the ﬁrst k segments; as P is the only user to
receive symbol 1 at time k + 1 it is thus impossible for an innocent user to
be framed over the entire k + 1 time segments. Hence the functions {Dα}k+1α=1
form a (k+ 1)-dynamic frameproof code. By Lemma 5.6 this is optimal when
79
the number of users is 2k.
Example 6.6 Suppose you have sixteen users, u0, u1, . . . , u15. Construc-
tion 6.12 can be implemented as follows. For k = 4 we are working in a
ﬁve-dimensional projective space that has coordinates (x0, x1, x2, x3, x4) with
the xi ∈ {0, 1} not all zero. Let Σ∞ be the hyperplane given by the equa-
tion x4 = 0, and represent each user by a point of PG(4, 2) \ Σ∞ by set-
ting u0 → (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) and u1 → (0, 0, 0, 1, 1), u2 → (0, 0, 1, 0, 1) and so on
up to u15 → (1, 1, 1, 1, 1). We let the hyperplanes Σ1,Σ2,Σ3,Σ4 be given by
equations x3 + x4 = 0, x2 + x4 = 0, x1 + x4 = 0 and x0 + x4 = 0 re-
spectively. The point (0, 0, 0, 0, 1) corresponding to user u0 does not lie in
Σ1 : x3 + x4 = 0, hence at time 1 the user u0 receives the symbol 0, whereas
the point (0, 0, 0, 1, 1) corresponding to u1 does lie in this hyperplane and thus
u1 receives a 1 at this time. The following table shows the marks received by
each user according to Construction 6.12 at times 1, 2, . . . , k+1 = 5 based on
a particular choice of pirate broadcast.
1 2 3 4 5
u0 0 0 0 0 0
u1 1 0 0 0 0
u2 0 1 0 0 1
u3 1 1 0 0 0
u4 0 0 1 0 0
u5 1 0 1 0 0
u6 0 1 1 0 0
u7 1 1 1 0 0
u8 0 0 0 1 0
u9 1 0 0 1 0
u10 0 1 0 1 0
u11 1 1 0 1 0
u12 0 0 1 1 0
u13 1 0 1 1 0
u14 0 1 1 1 0
u15 1 1 1 1 0
T 0 1 0 0 0
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The symbols broadcast by the pirate at times 1 through 4 correspond to
the four hyperplanes given by Σ′1 = Σ1 + Σ∞ : x3 = 0, Σ
′
2 = Σ2 : x2 + x4 = 0,
Σ′3 = Σ3 + Σ∞ : x1 = 0, Σ
′
4 = Σ4 + Σ∞ : x0 = 0. These hyperplanes intersect
in the point ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣


x0 x1 x2 x3 x4
0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 1
0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 0


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= (0, 0, 1, 0, 1)→ u2.
Hence the user u2 has been framed for the ﬁrst four segments (as is shown by
the table), and therefore receives a 1 at time 5, with all other users receiving 0
at this time. This ensures that no user has been framed over the ﬁrst k+1 = 5
segments. 
Similar ideas can be used in the construction of sliding-window l-dynamic
frameproof codes. Informally, during each time segment the broadcaster se-
lects either a hyperplane or a point of AG(k, 2) based on the pirate’s previous
broadcasts, and transmits segments marked with a 1 to the corresponding
users with the other users receiving 0s. This is made more precise in the
following construction and lemma.
Construction 6.13. Let Γ be the union of the set of points of AG(k, 2) with
the set of hyperplanes of AG(k, 2), let G1 be an element of Γ and suppose there
exists a countable family of functions {Gα}∞α=2, where Gα : GF (2)α−1 → Γ.
We construct a countable family of functions {Dα}∞α=1 with D1 : U → GF (2)
and Dα : GF (2)
α−1 × U → GF (2) for α > 1. The sequence broadcast by the
pirate prior to time α will be denoted Ξα = {ξi}α−1i=1 . We set
D1(u) =
{
1 if u ∈ G1
0 otherwise,
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and, for j > 1,
Dα(Ξα, u) =
{
1 if u ∈ Gα(Ξα)
0 otherwise.
This link between functions Gα associating subspaces of AG(k, 2) with
pirate broadcast sequences and functions Dα assigning marked segments to
users allows us to set geometric conditions for {Dα}∞α=1 to constitute a sliding-
window l-dynamic frameproof code. In order to express these conditions we
deﬁne PL = {i ∈ L | Gi(Ξi) is a point of AG(k, 2)} for any time interval L.
We will refer to time segments i ∈ L\PL, for which Gi(Ξi) is a hyperplane, as
ordinary segments, and we will use the notation Σi = Gi(Ξi). Time segments
i ∈ PL will be called protection segments, and the point Pi = Gi(Ξi) will be
said to have been protected during segment i, since the corresponding user has
received a unique mark and thus cannot be framed by any other users at that
time. For i ∈ L\PL set Σ′i = Σi if ξi = 1 and Σ′i = Σi+Σ∞ if ξi = 0. Then at
time i ∈ L \PL the hyperplane Σ′i contains those users whose received symbol
matches that broadcast by the pirate at that time.
Lemma 6.14. The family of functions {Dα}∞α=1 resulting from Construc-
tion 6.13 is a sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code if and only if for
every valid pirate broadcast sequence {ξi}∞i=1 we have that for every length l
interval L the set
SL =
⋂
i∈L\PL
Σ′i \ {Pj|j ∈ PL}
is empty.
Proof. Based on the above construction the set SL consists of those users
who have received symbols matching the pirate’s broadcast on all ordinary
segments of L but who have not been protected in any protection segment,
that is precisely of those users who have received a sequence of marks agreeing
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with that broadcast by the pirate. It then follows trivially from the deﬁnition
of a sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code that the code obtained from
the above construction is sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof precisely when
this set is empty. 
As an example of a geometric sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code we
describe a code analogous to that of Construction 6.11, recast in the geometric
setting.
Example 6.7 Suppose there exists a set U containing 2k users, where k is
square. Choose a set S = {Σ∞,Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σk} of k + 1 linearly-independent
hyperplanes in PG(k, 2) and associate each user u ∈ U with a point Pu in
PG(k, 2) \ Σ∞.
For i with (
√
k + 1) ∤ i deﬁne the images of Ξi under Gi to be succes-
sive hyperplanes from S, so that G1(Ξ1) = Σ1 and G2(Ξ2) = Σ2, and then
G√k+2(Ξ√k+2) = Σ√k+1 and so on.
When i < k +
√
k and (
√
k + 1) | i let Gi(Ξi) = Pu1. (This choice of point is
arbitrary.)
For i ≥ k +√k with (√k + 1) | i, deﬁne
Gi(Ξi) =
⋂
j∈{i−k−
√
k+1,...,i−1|(
√
k+1)∤j}
Σ′j .
By construction Gi(Ξi) is the intersection of k linearly-independent hyper-
planes and is thus a point of AG(k, 2).
Therefore {Gi}∞i=1 consists of
√
k ordinary segments followed by a protec-
tion segment, and during protection segments occurring after time k+
√
k the
user who has been framed over the previous k ordinary segments is protected.
For instance, in the case k = 4 if the coordinates are chosen as in Ex-
ample 6.6 and the same set of hyperplanes is used then the resulting code
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is the same as that described in Example 6.5 and Example 6.4 (comparing
the mark distribution tables of Example 6.6 and Example 6.4 reveals that the
distributions are the same during the corresponding ordinary segments).
We claim that the Gi thus deﬁned constitute a geometric sliding-window
(k + 2
√
k)-dynamic frameproof code.
Proof. At each time i ≥ k+√k where (√k + 1)|i a user is allocated a unique
mark, as for such i we have that Gi(Ξi) is a point corresponding to the only
user who may have been framed over the previous k+
√
k − 1 time segments.
Consider any time interval I of length k + 2
√
k. There will be a time i with
(
√
k + 1)|i within the last √k + 1 segments of that interval; the k + √k − 1
segments prior to i will be contained in I. These k+
√
k− 1 segments contain
precisely k ordinary segments so the corresponding hyperplanes Σ′i are linearly-
independent and thus intersect in a point. Hence over those k+
√
k segments
at most one user has been framed. That user is protected at time i, and thus
can not be framed at that time. Therefore we conclude that no user can be
framed for the entirety of I, and hence the code deﬁned by our Gi is indeed
sliding-window k + 2
√
k-dynamic frameproof. 
Thus we see that there exist geometric codes with a convergence time of
k + 2
√
k. In an eﬀort to bound the smallest possible convergence time that
can be achieved we consider here a particular strategy that might be adopted
by a pirate; the need to ensure that a code prevents framing by such a pirate
will allow us to deduce a bound for this minimal value.
Definition 6.15. We will use the term clever pirate to refer to a set of users
forming a pirate coalition that broadcasts marked segments according to the
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strategy described below. (The description being necessarily somewhat convo-
luted the strategy is perhaps better illustrated by Example 6.8.)
• At any protection segment broadcast a 0.
• If an ordinary segment lies in a block of consecutive ordinary segments
contained in a window whose kth ordinary segment falls in that block, and
if the point that is the intersection of the k hyperplanes corresponding to
the pirate’s broadcast in those segments has not been protected during that
window then broadcast the symbol pertaining to the hyperplane containing
that point.
• At an ordinary segment that follows a non-empty block of consecutive
protection segments choose a symbol corresponding to a hyperplane con-
taining at most half of the points protected in those segments. In any sub-
sequent ordinary segments broadcast the symbol whose hyperplane con-
tains at most half of those protected points lying in the previously chosen
hyperplane, unless you are in the situation mentioned in the previous
rule. If the previously chosen hyperplane contains none of those pro-
tected points, consider the previous non-empty block of consecutive pro-
tections segments and choose the hyperplane containing at most half of
those points thus protected that lie in the intersection of the hyperplanes
coming from all subsequent ordinary segments. If none of the points lie
in this intersection consider the previous block of protected segments and
so on, until you reach a block lying at least l segments prior to the current
one or until you reach the first time segment; if this happens broadcast
a 0.
The following example shows a clever pirate’s broadcast in response to the
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distribution of marks from a (supposed) sliding-window 7-dynamic frameproof
code for 23 users.
Example 6.8
1 2 3 4 5 6
u1 0 0 0 1 0 0 . . .
u2 0 0 1 0 0 0 . . .
u3 0 1 0 0 0 1 . . .
u4 0 1 1 0 0 1 . . .
u5 1 0 0 0 1 0 . . .
u6 1 0 1 0 1 0 . . .
u7 1 1 0 0 1 1 . . .
u8 1 1 1 0 1 1 . . .
T 0 0 0 0 1 0 . . .
Segment four is a protection segment, the others are all ordinary segments.
During the fourth segment the pirate is using the ﬁrst of the above rules, and in
the ﬁfth segment he is using the third rule: broadcasting a 1 here is equivalent
to choosing the hyperplane which does not contain the point belonging to u1,
who was protected in segment four. In the sixth time segment rule two is
being invoked: segment ﬁve is the third (i.e. the kth) ordinary segment of
the window commencing at segment two. The pirate broadcast in the three
ordinary segments 2, 3 and 5 corresponds to hyperplanes intersecting in u5’s
point, so in segment six the pirate broadcasts a 0 (the symbol received by u5
at this time). This second rule essentially ensures that any user who is framed
over the ﬁrst k ordinary segments of a window continues to be framed unless
explicitly protected by a protection segment. 
We note that for any geometric sliding-window dynamic frameproof code
there will always be some set of users capable of acting as a clever pirate as
the set of all users is certainly able to do so. Also (provided there are more
than two users) any set consisting of all but one user is also able to behave as
a clever pirate.
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The following lemma describes a consequence of a clever pirate’s actions,
and will play a role similar to that of Lemma 6.9 in allowing us to prove
Theorem 6.10, which gives us a bound for the convergence time of binary
geometric sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes.
Lemma 6.16. Let b be a positive integer, and suppose there are 2k users
for some k ≥ b. Suppose also that there exists a geometric code with the
property that when faced with a clever pirate at most b ordinary segments
occur consecutively at any time after some time t0. Then for any interval of
k+⌈k
b
⌉−2 consecutive segments occurring after t0 there exists some pirate set
T capable of behaving as a clever pirate and some user u /∈ T who is framed
over those segments.
Proof. Consider any length k+⌈k
b
⌉−2 interval occurring after time t0. Suppose
that a ≥ 0 ordinary segments occur within the interval. First we observe that
0 < a < k. If there were no ordinary segments then 2k protection segments
would be required to protect all the users, but k + ⌈k
b
⌉ − 2 < 2k − 2 < 2k for
all k. Furthermore, if there were k or more ordinary segments, the fact that
they can occur in blocks of at most b segments implies there would have to be
at least ⌈k
b
⌉ − 1 protection segments to separate them, which is impossible in
an interval of this size.
We assume therefore that there are 0 < a < k ordinary segments within
the interval. As these can occur in groups of at most b there must be at least
⌈a
b
⌉ − 1 protection segments separating them. For each of these separating
protection segments there is a corresponding nonempty block of consecutive
ordinary segments occurring at a later time within the interval; in the ﬁrst or-
dinary segment of each block the clever pirate uses rule three and thus excludes
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at least one protected point from the intersection of the pirate’s chosen hyper-
planes. There are then k + ⌈k
b
⌉ − 2− a− ⌈a
b
⌉+ 1 further protection segments
whose protected points may lie in this intersection.
Now a hyperplanes intersect in a space of dimension k− a containing 2k−a
points of which up to k + ⌈k
b
⌉ − 1− a− ⌈a
b
⌉ are protected.
We observe that
2k−a − (k + k
b
) + a+
a
b
= 2k−a − (k − a)b+ 1
b
≥ 2k−a − 2(k − a) (as b ≥ 1)
≥ 0.
Hence 2k−a + a + a
b
≥ k + k
b
and therefore 2k−a + a + ⌈a
b
⌉ ≥ k + ⌈k
b
⌉, and
2k−a − (k + ⌈k
b
⌉ − 1− a− ⌈a
b
⌉) ≥ 1. Thus we conclude that there is at least
one user who is framed over the entire interval. If we denote this user by u
then the set U \{u} is capable of behaving as a clever pirate and thus framing
u. 
By deﬁnition a sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code must be able to
protect every potentially-innocent user from being framed regardless of which
users form the pirate coalition and which marks it chooses to broadcast; it
must therefore be able to protect all users from a clever pirate. We use this
fact to obtain the following result.
Theorem 6.17. A binary geometric sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code
protecting 2k users must satisfy l ≥ k + ⌈2√k⌉ − 1.
Proof. The proof of this result is analogous to that of Theorem 6.10. Suppose
there exits a binary geometric sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code with
l ≤ k + ⌈2√k⌉ − 2. Suppose the code is applied against a clever pirate, and
consider a length l windowW starting after time t = l(2
√
k−1) that ends with
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b consecutive ordinary segments, for some b ≥ 1. As before we can assume
b < 2
√
k. Prior to these b segments the window contains l−b segments, ending
with a protection segment. However l−b < k+⌈2√k⌉−1−b. This is less than
k + ⌈k
b
⌉ − 1 for any k and b > 0 since (√k − b)2 ≥ 0, implying k + b2 ≥ 2b√k
and thus k
b
≥ 2√k − b. Suppose that these l − b segments have the property
that at most b ordinary segments occur consecutively. By Lemma 6.16 at
least one user has been framed over those l − b segments. We claim that the
clever pirate continues to frame one or more of these users over the remaining
b ordinary segments of the window. At the ﬁrst of these ordinary segments
the third clever pirate rule is invoked, so the pirate chooses the hyperplane
whose intersection with the previously-chosen hyperplanes contains the least
number of points protected by the most recent block of protection segments.
Lemma 6.16 implies that at least one point in this intersection is not protected,
hence the intersection with the newly-chosen hyperplane must also contain at
least one unprotected point. During the remaining segments either the third
rule is used again, in which case there is at least one user who continues
to be framed as before, or else the second rule is required. In this case the
intersection of the ﬁrst k hyperplanes chosen by the pirate is an unprotected
point, which will lie in any further hyperplanes chosen. Hence the intersection
of all the hyperplanes chosen by the pirate in the window W contains at least
one unprotected point. Thus some user is framed over the entire window,
contradicting the fact that the code was sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof.
From this we deduce that the ﬁrst l − b segments of the window must in fact
have included some block of b′ > b consecutive ordinary segments.
Repeating this process as in the proof of Theorem 6.10 leads to a con-
tradiction as before, thus implying that l is in fact greater than or equal to
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k + ⌈2√k⌉ − 1. 
This result yields a much-improved lower bound on l for most values of
k. There is still a slight discrepancy between the upper and lower bounds for
l, as the best known construction have l = k + ⌈2√k⌉, one greater than the
above lower bound. Thus a problem remains open: does there exist a binary,
geometric, sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code with l = k + ⌈2√k⌉ − 1?
Also, the above bound applies only to geometric codes. Attempts to extend
the concept of a clever pirate to the setting of general binary sliding-window
dynamic frameproof codes encounter the problem that whereas in the geo-
metric setting exactly half the users received each symbol during an ordinary
segment, in the general case this is not necessarily so. This causes the dilemma
that whereas choosing one mark might result in more users being framed in
a particular segment, choosing the other might enable the pirate to continue
framing a larger group than would otherwise be the case. Thus it is not always
immediately clear which choice of broadcast mark most beneﬁts the pirate. (In
practice the pirate will be unaware of the mark distribution and will there-
fore not be consciously making such choices; as we wish to protect against all
pirates, however, we need to make sure our schemes are proof against pirates
who by chance choose to broadcast those symbols that beneﬁt them most.)
Example 6.9 Suppose the mark distribution and pirate broadcast over four
time segments are as follows.
1 2 3 4
u0 0 0 0 0
u1 0 1 0 1
u2 1 0 0 0
u3 0 0 1 1
u4 1 1 1 1
T 0 0 0 ?
At time 4, by broadcasting a 1 the pirate can frame three users instead of
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two, increasing its potential to continue framing in successive segments. By
broadcasting a 0, however, the pirate ensures that two users instead of no users
are framed over segments 2 to 4, and similarly ensures user u0 is framed over
all four segments, whereas no user would have been thus framed had 1 been
chosen. 
This leads to a second open problem: do there exist binary sliding-window
dynamic frameproof codes protecting n users with a convergence time l less
than that of any geometric binary sliding-window dynamic frameproof code
protecting n users?
We now proceed to describe geometric constructions for sliding-window
dynamic frameproof codes using alphabets of size q > 2. We will see that
when q > 2 the geometrically-constructed codes certainly do not achieve the
optimum possible l.
6.3 Geometric Constructions for Prime Power
Values of q
The geometric constructions of binary sliding-window dynamic frameproof
codes in the previous section generalise readily to yield q-ary sliding-window
dynamic codes where q is a power of a prime. In this section we describe
these generalisations and discuss certain limitations of codes constructed in
this manner.
For every prime power q and for every positive integer k there exists a
k-dimensional aﬃne space AG(k, q) containing qk points. The hyperplanes
of AG(k, q) are partitioned into parallel classes, each containing q pairwise
disjoint hyperplanes. Given a parallel class ∆ the hyperplanes within that
class can therefore be labelled H∆i where i ∈ GF (q). We use this fact in
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constructing mark distributions from sequences of elements in Γq,k by the
following method, which is a generalisation of Construction 6.13.
Construction 6.18. Let q be a prime power. Suppose there are qk users; we
identify these users with the points of AG(k, q). Define the set Γq,k by setting
Γq,k = {points of AG(k, q)} ∪ {parallel classes of hyperplanes of AG(k, q)}.
Suppose there exists a countable family of functions {Gα}∞α=2 where the
function Gα : GF (q)
α−1 → Γq,k, and let G1 be an element of Γq,k.
We construct a family of functions {Dα}∞α=1 with D1 : U → GF (q) and
Dα : GF (q)
α−1 × U → GF (q) for α > 1 by setting
D1(u) =


1 if G1 = u,
i if u ∈ HG1i ,
0 otherwise,
and
Dα(Ξα, u) =


1 if Gα(Ξα) = u,
i if u ∈ HGα(Ξα)i ,
0 otherwise,
for α > 1.
As in the binary case, if Gα(Ξα) is a point, then the corresponding user
receives a 1 and all others receive a 0; this is a protection segment. If Gα(Ξα)
is a parallel class then the users are partitioned by the hyperplanes of this class
into q pair-wise disjoint sets of qk−1 users, with all the users in a set receiving
the same symbol. Segments where this occurs are called ordinary segments, as
before. The diﬀerence from the binary case is simply that in ordinary segments
the users are split into q sets instead of 2 by the distribution of the symbols.
As previously, if L is a time interval we deﬁne the set of time segments
PL = {i ∈ L|Gi(Ξi) is a point of AG(q, k)} and we denote Gi(Ξi) by Pi when
i ∈ PL. If the pirate broadcast is {ξi}∞i=1 then for i ∈ L \ PL we set
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Σ′i = Σ
Gi(Ξi)
ξi
; this is the hyperplane in class Gi(Ξi) whose points correspond
to the users whose marks match the pirate’s broadcast at time i. Then we see
that Lemma 6.14 remains valid in this context too:
Lemma 6.19. The family of functions {Dα}∞α=1 is a sliding-window l-dynamic
frameproof code if and only if for every valid pirate broadcast sequence {ξi}∞i=1
we have that for every length l interval L the set
SL =
⋂
i∈L\PL
Σ′i \ {Pj|j ∈ PL}
is empty.
In the case where q is a prime power and k is a square we can use this lemma
to generalise the construction of Example 6.7 to yield a q-ary geometric sliding
window (k+2
√
k)-dynamic frameproof code protecting qk users, as described
below.
Example 6.10 Suppose that there are qk users with q a prime power and k
square. Choose a set S = {Σ∞,Σ1,Σ2, . . . ,Σk} of k + 1 linearly-independent
hyperplanes in PG(k, q), and associate each user u ∈ U with a point Pu in
the space AG(k, q) = PG(k, q) \ Σ∞. The hyperplanes of AG(k, q) given by
Σi ∩ AG(k, q) for i ∈ 1, 2, . . . , k each lie in distinct parallel classes, since the
set of hyperplanes {Σi|i =∞, 1, 2, . . . , k} is linearly independent. Denote the
parallel class containing Σi by ∆i, and let D = {∆i|i = 1, 2, . . . , k}.
For i with (
√
k + 1) ∤ i deﬁne the images of Ξi under Gi to be successive
parallel classes from D, so that G1(Ξ1) = ∆1 and G2(Ξ2) = ∆2, and then
G√k+2(Ξ
√
k+2) = ∆
√
k+1 and so on.
When i < k +
√
k and (
√
k + 1) | i let Gi(Ξi) = Pu1. (This choice of point
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is arbitrary.) For i ≥ k +√k with (√k + 1) | i, deﬁne
Gi(Ξi) =
⋂
j∈{i−k−√k+1,...,i−1|(√k+1)∤j}
Σ′j .
By construction Gi(Ξi) is the intersection of k hyperplanes from diﬀerent par-
allel classes, which are therefore linearly independent, hence this intersection
is a point of AG(k, q). The proof that Example 6.7 yields a sliding-window
(k + 2
√
k)-dynamic frameproof code can now be applied to show that this
construction also produces a sliding-window (k + 2
√
k)-dynamic frameproof
code, except that in this case the alphabet is of size q, and the number of
users protected is qk. 
It is possible to generalise Construction 6.12 in the same manner, yielding
a (k + 1)-dynamic frameproof code protecting qk users. This is described in
the following example, which may also serve to elucidate Example 6.10.
Example 6.11 Suppose there are nine users and you wish to construct a
3-ary, 3-dynamic frameproof code. In this case k = 2 so PG(k, 3) is the
projective plane of order 3, whose hyperplanes are lines and whose points have
coordinates (x, y, z) with x, y, z ∈ GF (3) not all zero. The lines Σ∞ : z = 0,
Σ1 : x = 0 and Σ2 : y = 0 are linearly independent. We choose Σ∞ to be
the line at inﬁnity and associate points of Pu ∈ PG(2, 3) \ Σ∞ with each
user by setting u0 → (0, 0, 1), u1 → (0, 1, 1), u2 → (0, 2, 1), u3 → (1, 0, 1),
u4 → (1, 1, 1), u5 → (1, 2, 1), u6 → (2, 0, 1), u7 → (2, 1, 1) and u8 → (2, 2, 1).
The parallel class ∆1 contains the lines H
∆1
0 : x = 0, H
∆1
1 : x + z = 0
and H∆12 : x + 2z = 0; the parallel class ∆2 contains lines H
∆2
0 : y = 0,
H∆21 : y + z = 0 and H
∆2
2 : y + 2z = 0.
We deﬁne functions Dα for α = 1, 2 by
Dα(Ξα, u) = i when u ∈ H∆αi .
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We also deﬁne a function D3 by setting
D3(Ξ3, u) =
{
1 if u = Σ′1 ∩ Σ′2,
0 otherwise.
At time 1 the point (0, 1, 1) corresponding to user u1 lies on the line H
∆1
0 , so
this user receives the symbol 0 at this time, and so on. The marks received
by the users, given a particular pirate broadcast, are shown in the following
table.
1 2 3
u0 0 0 0
u1 0 2 0
u2 0 1 0
u3 2 0 0
u4 2 2 0
u5 2 1 0
u6 1 0 0
u7 1 2 0
u8 1 1 1
T 1 1 0
The marks broadcast by the pirates at times 1 and 2 correspond to the lines
H∆11 and H
∆2
1 respectively, which intersect in the point∣∣∣∣∣∣

x y z1 0 1
0 1 1


∣∣∣∣∣∣ = (2, 2, 1)→ u8,
hence user u8 receives a 1 at time 3, with the other users receiving 0. 
We have thus seen how geometric constructions yield (k + 1)-dynamic
frameproof codes protecting qk users using an alphabet of size q. We know,
however, from Theorem 5.6 that this is not optimal when q > 2, as there exist
q-ary, (k + 1)-dynamic frameproof codes protecting up to qk(q − 1) users. We
will see in the following chapter that the sliding-window dynamic frameproof
codes of Example 6.10 are also suboptimal in the number of users they sup-
port. This points to a weakness in the geometric construction when q > 2,
which is quickly seen to arise from the protection segments. In the binary
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case it was only possible to protect one user in any given segment. When
q > 2 it is possible to assign up to q− 1 unique marks and thereby protect up
to q − 1 users in one segment. The geometric constructions described above
only permit one user to be protected, however, thereby losing this potential
ﬂexibility. One might be tempted to modify the deﬁnition of the geometric
construction to enable q− 1 users to be protected in each protection segment.
The problem with this, however, is that the set of users framed over a series of
γ ordinary segments is a subspace of AG(k, q) and consequently contains qk−γ
users. Thus if more than one user is in danger at a protection segment then
at least q users are, so it is impossible to protect all of them in one segment.
The number q − 1 of possible unique marks in any one segment does not ﬁt
eﬃciently with the fact that the number of users is restricted to being a power
of q; consider the fact that l-dynamic frameproof codes can protect at most
ql−1(q − 1) users. One might consider using a subset of AG(k, q) of an appro-
priate size, but in doing so one loses the symmetry that made the geometric
constructions attractive in the ﬁrst place.
A restriction to protecting at most one user per segment might not in
fact be a problem (see Section 7.3); the real disadvantage of the geometric
constructions described above is the fact that in protection segments only two
symbols are used, hence q − 2 potentially-useful symbols are wasted. It is
possible to distribute q − 1 symbols amongst the users and still give a unique
mark to one user. Examples of this were seen in Construction 6.4, which
yields shorter convergence times than the geometric constructions for certain
numbers of users.
Lastly, there is also the objection that the geometric construction is re-
stricted to cases where q is a prime power. In the following chapter we will
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investigate q-ary sliding-window dynamic frameproof codes for general q that
draw their inspiration from the geometric constructions, but which overcome
the abovementioned shortcomings to protect greater numbers of users for a
given value of l.
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Chapter 7
Improved Constructions of
Sliding-Window Dynamic
Frameproof Codes
In this chapter we investigate a family of constructions of sliding-window
l-dynamic frameproof codes, and show that all our previous constructions can
be interpreted as members of this family. We make use of this connection to
compare our existing constructions and consider optimal choices of certain pa-
rameters. We then demonstrate that it is possible to construct sliding-window
dynamic frameproof codes that protect more users than those resulting from
previous constructions when the same parameters are used. We show that
the schemes arising from these new constructions are optimal for the given
parameters. After a brief consideration of the asymptotic properties of these
codes as the alphabet size is increased we conclude with a discussion of some
unresolved issues.
7.1 A Unifying Family of Constructions
So far we have seen several constructions for q-ary sliding-window dynamic
frameproof codes such as Construction 6.4, the construction of Example 6.10,
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and the construction arising from the repeated application of dynamic frame-
proof codes (see Example 6.2). In general it can be hard to say conclusively
whether one of these constructions is better than another; quick calculations
serve to demonstrate that for certain values of l, q and n one of these con-
structions is more eﬃcient than the others, whereas other choices of parameter
may lead to a less-eﬃcient code resulting from the same construction.
Example 7.1 Suppose there are qk users, where q = 3 and k = 25. Then Con-
struction 6.4 yields a sliding-window 41-dynamic frameproof code, whereas
Example 6.10 yields a more-eﬃcient sliding-window 35-dynamic frameproof
code. If, however, q is increased to 20 then the tables are turned, with the code
resulting from Construction 6.4 being sliding-window 27-dynamic, making it
more eﬃcient then the sliding-window 35-dynamic frameproof code resulting
from Example 6.10. 
These constructions all have certain elements in common, however, such
as their use of unique marks, the necessity of which can be shown by adapting
the proof of Lemma 4.5. In fact we will see that these separate constructions
can instead be thought of as members of a larger family of constructions.
7.2 A New Family of Constructions
Section 6.3 contained a discussion of some of the limitations inherent in geo-
metric constructions when the alphabet size is greater than two. This forces us
to go beyond the restrictions of the geometric setting if we wish to construct
more-eﬃcient schemes. In what follows we discuss several heuristic princi-
ples that can be used to inform the design of such schemes, and we present a
construction based on these principles.
In general we observe that any time segment can be either a protection
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segment (in which at least one user receives a unique mark) or an ordinary
segment. It would seem desirable in an ordinary segment to divide the q
available symbols as evenly as possible among the users, as this ensures that
that at most
⌈
n
q
⌉
users will receive a symbol matching the pirate broadcast at
that time.
In a protection segment it is possible to protect up to q − 1 users, since
an alphabet of size q allows at most q − 1 unique symbols to be distributed.
Inﬂexibility in this respect was one of the limitations of the geometric schemes
discussed in Section 6.3. To overcome this, we introduce a parameter a, with
1 ≤ a ≤ q−1 being the number of users protected in each protection segment.
Choosing to protect the same number of users in each protection segment not
only simpliﬁes the description of the scheme but permits us to choose the
number a that leads to the most eﬃcient schemes, given particular values of l
and q. Once a users are protected q− a symbols remain at the disposal of the
broadcaster; as in the case of the ordinary segments these remaining marks
will be distributed evenly among the remaining users. Thus at most
⌈
n−a
q−a
⌉
users can be framed in such a segment.
It would be possible to envisage a scheme in which the distribution of
protection segments was determined as a reaction to the pirate broadcast.
In the construction described below, however, the distribution of the protec-
tion segments will be predetermined, with the information from the pirate
broadcast being used instead to determine which users are protected in each
such segment. We introduce a second parameter b ≥ 0, being the number
of ordinary segments occurring between successive protection segments. As
discussed above this simpliﬁes the description of the schemes and allows an
optimal spacing of the protection segments to be determined. We observe that
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any ordinary segments occurring after the ﬁnal protection segment cannot be
relied upon for framing prevention. If there are b ordinary segments between
protection segments, then a window ends in at most b ordinary segments. In
this case the ﬁnal protection segment is preceded by l−b−⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉
ordinary seg-
ments and
⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉− 1 protection segments that fall within that window. Every
length l window can thus be guaranteed to have at least this many ordinary
and protection segments occurring before the ﬁnal protection segment of the
window.
Having decided how many unique marks to allocate in a protection seg-
ment, and how many ordinary segments will lie between those segments, it
is necessary to decide how to determine the mark distribution within each
segment, given the condition that non-unique symbols are evenly distributed
among the users. We wish to avoid the case where the same mark distribution
is used in adjacent ordinary segments as the pirate could then broadcast the
same symbol each time, thus continuing to frame a particular set of users,
without yielding any new information that would help prevent this framing.
Example 7.2 Of the tables below, the one on the left illustrates two ordinary
segments using the same distribution. Here the pirate frames three users over
both segments.
1 2
u0 0 0
u1 0 0
u2 0 0
u3 1 1
u4 1 1
u5 1 1
u6 2 2
u7 2 2
u8 2 2
T 0 0
1 2
u0 0 0
u1 0 1
u2 0 2
u3 1 0
u4 1 1
u5 1 2
u6 2 0
u7 2 1
u8 2 2
T 0 0
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In the table on the right, however, the pirate is only able to frame one user,
no matter what marks it decides to broadcast, as each user has received a
diﬀerent pair of marks. 
In the geometric constructions we used linearly independent hyperplanes
in successive ordinary segments. This ensured not only that each symbol was
distributed evenly among the users in each ordinary segment, but also that in
every i succesive ordinary segments, for i = 1, 2, . . . , k all the possible length i
sequence of symbols were evenly distributed among the users over that time.
We will make use of this property in our subsequent construction.
Taking the above considerations in mind we now present a construction of
a family of q-ary sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes.
Construction 7.1. Let q ≥ 2 and Q = {0, 1, . . . , q − 1}, with 1 ≤ a ≤ q − 1,
and b ≥ 0 with l ≥ 2b + 1. We will construct a sliding-window l-dynamic
frameproof code supporting n = ql−b−⌈ l−bb+1⌉(q − a)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1a users.
Consider the set S of all words of length l− b− 1 whose first l − b− ⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉
letters come from Q and whose remaining letters are restricted to the set
{0, 1, . . . , q − a − 1}. Then S contains ql−b−⌈ l−bb+1⌉(q − a)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1 = n
a
words.
Define an n × (l − b − 1) array M = (mij) by letting the first a rows of M
be given by a particular word from S, the next a rows be given by a different
word of S, and so on. We partition M into an array MO = (gij) of size
n× (l− b− ⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉)
and an array MP = (hij) of size n×
(⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉− 1) by letting
MO consist of the first l − b−
⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉
columns of M , and MP the rest.
M =


g11 · · · g
1
„
l−b−
⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉« h11 · · · h
1
„⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉
−1
«
...
...
...
...
gn1 · · · g
n
„
l−b−
⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉« hn1 · · · h
n
„⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉
−1
«


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The entries of MO come from Q, and those of MP lie in {0, 1, . . . , q − a− 1}.
We will now use these arrays in the construction of the mark distribution for
a sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code.
• Segments occurring at times j where (b+1) ∤ j will be ordinary segments.
We define a function D1 : U → Q by
D1(ui) = gi1.
• We define the distribution at successive ordinary segments by using suc-
cessive columns of MO. So if at some ordinary segment the column γ−1
of MO was used
(
mod l − b− ⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉)
and the next ordinary segment oc-
curs at some time j we define Dj : Q
j−1 × U → Q by
Dj(Ξj , ui) = giγ.
• In protection segments occurring before time l−b we will protect the first
a users; this choice is arbitrary (see note below). In the first protection
segment, occurring at time b+ 1, we define Db+1 by
Db+1(Ξj , ui) =
{
i+ q − a when j = 0, 1, . . . , a,
hi1 otherwise.
• In subsequent protection segments occurring prior to time l − b we con-
tinue to protect the first a users, and distribute the rest of the marks
according to successive columns of MP .
• At the first protection segment occurring at time l − b or later, we con-
sider the l−b−1 previous time segments. We observe that l−b−⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉
of
these are ordinary segments, and the remaining
⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉− 1 are protection
segments. Because of the way the marks have been allocated these seg-
ments represent a permutation of the columns of M and the sequences of
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marks received by each user will be such that each possible sequence will
have been received by up to a users. As each row in M matched exactly
a− 1 other rows of M we see that the pirate will have framed at most a
users (it may be the case that some of the a users whose sequences would
otherwise have corresponded to that row of M were actually previously
protected during this time). The symbols q−a, q−a+1, . . . , q−1 are al-
located to these users as unique marks; the other users have their marks
allocated according to the next column of MP .
• This same procedure is followed at all future protection segments.
We note that the choice of users who are protected in the ﬁrst l−1 segments
does not aﬀect the functioning of the scheme: there is no danger of a user
having been framed over l segments as there aren’t enough previous segments.
Each window of l consecutive segments must include some sequence of l − b
segments ending with a protection segment, due to the fact that the last
protection segment of any window is at most b segments from the end of the
window. Therefore each window contains a sequence of l − b segments over
which no user has been framed; hence the resulting scheme is a sliding-window
l-dynamic frameproof code.
Example 7.3 Suppose q = 4 and l = 5, and that a = 2 and b = 1.

0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 1
0 0 1
0 1 0
...
...
...
3 3 0
3 3 1
3 3 1


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Then the above construction yields a code protecting 64 users; the correspond-
ing array M appears above.
The following table demonstrates how the marks are allocated to some of
the 64 users over the ﬁrst nine segments, based on a particular pirate broad-
cast.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
u0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
u1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
u2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
u3 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
u4 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0
u5 0 0 1 3 0 0 1 0 0
u6 0 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 0
u7 0 1 1 1 0 3 1 1 0
u8 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 2 0
u9 0 0 2 0 0 0 2 3 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
u64 3 1 3 1 3 1 3 1 3
T 0 0 1 1 0 0 2 1 3
Unique marks have been written in bold, the odd-numbered segments are
ordinary segments and the even-numbered segments are protection segments.
Any user who is framed over the three segments prior to a protection segment
receives a unique mark in that segment, which ensures that no user is framed
over four segments that commence with an odd-numbered segment. As any
length 5 window contains such a sequence of segments this mark distribution
corresponds to a sliding-window 5-dynamic frameproof code. 
In fact all the previously-discussed constructions of sliding-window dy-
namic frameproof codes, except for the sub-optimal Example 6.10, can be
thought of as members of the family of such codes created in the above man-
ner. In Table 7.1 we list all these constructions, as well as the lengths, alphabet
sizes and values of a and b that give rise to them.
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Construction q l a b n
Example 6.2 3 21 2 10 2× 310
Construction 6.4 q l 1 0 (q − 1)l−1
Construction 6.7 2 2k 1 k − 1 2k
Construction 6.11 2 k + 2
√
k 1
√
k 2k
Example 6.7 2 k + 2
√
k 1
√
k 2k
Table 7.1: parameters of the known constructions of sliding-window l-dynamic
frameproof codes
The fact that all these constructions can be viewed as members of a com-
mon family gives us a framework in which to compare them, and they can be
related to each other through the parameters a and b. Given particular values
of q and l the broadcaster can choose the values of these parameters in order
to maximise the number of users supported by the resulting scheme.
In the following sections we look more closely at special cases corresponding
to particular choices for the parameters a and b and consider situations in
which it is beneﬁcial to use these values.
7.3 The Case where a = 1
Sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes arising from the above construc-
tion can support up to ql−b−⌈ l−bb+1⌉(q − a)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1a users. In the case where
l = 2b + 1 this reduces to qba, which is maximised with respect to a when
a = q − 1. If l > 2b+ 1, however, we have
n(a) = ql−b−⌈ l−bb+1⌉(q − a)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1a,
the derivative of which is
dn
da
= ql−b−⌈ l−bb+1⌉
(
(q − a)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1 − a (⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉− 1) (q − a)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−2) ,
= ql−b−⌈ l−bb+1⌉(q − a)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−2 (q − ⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉
a
)
.
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The ﬁrst two factors of this expression are positive, hence the derivative is
zero only when a = q⌈ l−bb+1⌉ . Therefore n(a) has a single stationary point, which
is a local maximum, thus n is maximal when a takes this value. When l is
suﬃciently large with respect to b and q this quantity is less than one, hence
the optimal value for a (which has to be a positive integer) is 1. This is a
plausible scenario, since the broadcaster is likely to wish to use a small value
of q to reduce costs, which will necessitate a larger value of l. Furthermore, in
the case of a binary alphabet a is necessarily equal to 1. When a = 1 we have
that n = ql−b−⌈ l−bb+1⌉(q− 1)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1. Ignoring the ceilings and treating this as a
continuous function we see that
n(b) = ql−b−
l−b
b+1 (q − 1) l−bb+1−1,
= eln q(l−b−
l+1
b+1
+1)+ln(q−1)( l+1b+1−2).
Taking the derivative with respect to b yields
dn
db
=
(
ln q
(
−1 + l+1
(b+1)2
)
− ln(q − 1) l+1
(b+1)2
)
ql−b−
l−b
b+1 (q − 1) l−bb+1−1,
=
(
l+1
(b+1)2
(ln q − ln(q − 1))− ln q
)
ql−b−
l−b
b+1 (q − 1) l−bb+1−1.
The ﬁnal two factors in this expression are non-zero, hence n(b) has stationary
points when
(b+ 1)2 = (1− logq(q − 1))(l + 1).
This equation has two solutions, one with b > 0 that corresponds to a local
maximum, the other with b < 0. Hence when b is restricted to the region
0 ≤ b ≤ l−1
2
the value of n is maximised when b satisﬁes the above equation.
In the binary case this amounts to (b + 1)2 = l + 1. This accords with what
we have seen with Construction 6.11 where a code with minimal l = k + 2
√
k
was found to result from b =
√
k, since (
√
k + 1)2 = k + 2
√
k + 1.
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In practice numerical calculations can be used to determine the optimal
value of b for a particular q and l, but this analysis at least gives an idea of
the expected results.
7.4 The Case where b = 0
The quantity n is of the form ql−b+1 + O(ql−b−2). The degree of the leading
term is maximal when b = 0, hence for suﬃciently large q choosing a scheme
with b = 0 will result in the greatest number of users being protected. In
this case the slight gain represented by having more ordinary segments with q
symbols to divide among the users instead of the q−a available in a protection
segment is oﬀset by the fact that there are up to b ordinary segments at the
end of a window that cannot guarantee protection, which means there are
fewer multiples of (q − a) or q contributing to the value of n.
When b = 0 we have n = (q − a)l−1a. This is maximised when a = q
l
,
which leads to n = (l−1)
l−1
ll
ql.
7.5 Improved Constructions of Sliding-Window
Dynamic Frameproof Codes
We have a framework in which to analyse known constructions of sliding-
window l-dynamic frameproof codes; we now wish to determine whether there
exist constructions that can protect more users for given values of q and l. In
fact better constructions do exist, as we will see in the following section. The
codes resulting from Construction 7.1, while having many beneﬁcial properties,
are still ineﬃcient in certain respects. For example they rely on the last
protection segment of each window to protect any previously-framed users,
without taking into account any protection resulting from protection segments
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occurring earlier in the window. On account of this, in some windows the
number of users framed prior to the ﬁnal protection segment may be less than
a, in which case to protect a users at that time is to fail to use the available
resources with maximal eﬃciency. Information from the pirate broadcast is
only used to determine which users are protected in the protection segments;
in the following section we will see constructions in which this information is
used not only for this purpose, but also for determining how non-unique marks
are distributed at each time.
7.5.1 Improved Constructions with b = 0
In the interest of simplicity we begin by considering the case in which precisely
a users receive unique marks in every segment. We ﬁnd that it is possible to
construct sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes with this property, that
protect up to a
(
(q−a)l−1+(q−a)l−2+· · ·+(q−a)+1) users. This construction
relies on the trivial observation that if the pirate broadcast at time t is ξt then
any users requiring protection at time t+1 must also have received the symbol
ξt at time t. In later sections we generalise it to the case where b > 0.
Construction 7.2. This construction uses the alphabet Q = {0, 1, . . . , q− 1}
to protect n = a
(
(q− a)l−1+(q− a)l−2+ · · ·+(q− a)+ 1) users over windows
of size l, with a users receiving unique marks in each segment.
• In the first time segment, give the marks q− a, q− a+1, . . . , q− 1 to the
first a users. The remaining marks are to be distributed evenly among
the remaining a
(
q− a)l−1+ (q− a)l−2+ · · ·+ (q− a)) users; we observe
that each mark is received by a
(
(q−a)l−2+(q−a)l−3+ · · ·+(q−a)+1)
of those users.
109
• Denote the pirate broadcast at time 1 by ξ1. In the second time segment
give the marks q− a, q− a+1, . . . , q− 1 to the first a users who received
the mark ξ1 at time 1. Distribute the first q−a symbols evenly among the
rest of the users who were framed at time 1; each mark is thus received
by a
(
(q − a)l−3 + (q − a)l−4 + · · · + (q − a) + 1) of these users. Then
distribute those symbols evenly among the remaining users.
• Repeat this process for the first l−1 segments as follows: at time t protect
the first a users who have been framed over the first t − 1 segments.
Distribute the first q− a symbols evenly among the remaining users who
have been framed over those segments. Then consider the set of users
who have been framed over segments 2 to t − 1; give the symbols 0 to
q− a− 1 to any users of this set who have yet to be allocated a mark so
that these symbols are distributed evenly among the users in this set other
than those protected at time t. Note that the number of users framed over
this time is a
(
(q−a)l−1−(t−2)+(q−a)l−2−(t−2)+ · · ·+(q−a)+1) and a of
them have been protected at time t, hence each of the first q− a symbols
is received by a
(
(q−a)l−2−(t−2)+(q−a)l−3−(t−2)+ · · ·+(q−a)+1) users
in this set. Then repeat this process with the set of users who have been
framed over segments 3 to t − 1 and so on until all users have received
marks.
• The number of users who have been framed over the first l−1 segments is
a; at time l give these users the unique marks q − a, q − a + 1, . . . , q − 1.
Then consider any remaining users who have been framed over the pre-
vious l− 2 segments and allocate the first q − a symbols to them so that
these symbols are evenly distributed on the set of all unprotected users
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framed over these segments. Then repeat this process with the set of users
who have been framed over the previous l − 3 segments, and so on until
all users have received marks.
• Repeat this process in all subsequent segments.
This construction ensures that precisely a users are framed over the ﬁrst
l − 1 segments of each window; these users are then protected in the ﬁnal
segment of the window, hence the resulting mark distribution constitutes a
sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code. This example shows how it works
in practice.
Example 7.4 Let l = 3 and q = 4, with a = 2. Then the resulting scheme
will protect 2(22+2+1) = 14 users. The following table shows an example of
the above construction being applied over 7 segments given a particular choice
of pirate broadcast.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
u0 2 0 0 2 0 0 0
u1 3 0 0 3 0 0 0
u2 0 2 0 0 2 0 0
u3 0 3 0 0 3 0 0
u4 0 0 2 0 0 1 0
u5 0 0 3 0 0 1 0
u6 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
u7 0 1 0 1 0 1 1
u8 1 0 1 0 1 2 1
u9 1 0 1 0 1 3 1
u10 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
u11 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
u12 1 1 1 1 1 1 2
u13 1 1 1 1 1 1 3
T 0 0 0 0 1 1 0
We observe that it does not matter how the symbols are distributed among
users who have not been framed, except that an overall even distribution of
symbols in each segment must be achieved. Hence users u10 to u13 receive the
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same sequence on the ﬁrst ﬁve segments without ill eﬀect, as none of them are
framed on any of those segments. 
This construction is clearly more eﬃcient then Construction 7.1, since with
the same parameters it can protect a
(
(q−a)l−1+(q−a)l−2+ · · ·+(q−a)+1)
users, compared with a(q − a)l−1. In fact no greater number of users can be
protected by a scheme in which precisely a users receive unique marks in each
segment:
Theorem 7.3. Suppose there exists a q-ary sliding-window l-dynamic frame-
proof code protecting n users, in which a users receive unique marks during
each segment, with 1 ≤ a ≤ q − 1. Then n satisfies
n ≤ a((q − a)l−1 + (q − a)l−2 + · · ·+ (q − a) + 1).
Proof. Suppose there exists such a code protecting n users where n satis-
ﬁes n ≥ a((q − a)l−1 + (q − a)l−2 + · · ·+ (q − a) + 1)+ 1. Suppose a pirate
adopts the strategy over the ﬁrst l time segments of always broadcasting a sym-
bol that ensures that the greatest possible number of users has been framed
over those segments. During the ﬁrst time segment a users receive unique
marks, which leaves q−a marks to be distributed among the remaining users.
By the pigeon-hole principle one such mark is received by at least h1 users,
where h1 = a
(
(q− a)l−2+ (q− a)l−3+ · · ·+ (q− a) + 1)+ 1; hence at least h1
users are framed at this time. In the second time segment, there exists some
symbol that is received by at least h2 of the users framed at time 1, where
h2 is equal to
⌈
h1−a
q−a
⌉
= a
(
(q − a)l−3 + (q − a)l−4 + · · · + (q − a) + 1) + 1.
Thus the pirate broadcasts a symbol ensuring that at least h2 users have
been framed over the ﬁrst two symbols. Applying this reasoning to the ﬁrst
l − 1 time segments ensures that over the ﬁrst i of these segments at least
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hi = a
(
(q − a)l−i−1 + (q − a)l−i−2 + · · · + (q − a) + 1) + 1 users have been
framed, hence at least a + 1 users are framed over the ﬁrst l − 1 segments.
As only a users are protected in segment l, however, there exists at least one
user who has been framed over the ﬁrst l − 1 segments yet is not protected
at time l. If the pirate broadcasts the symbol received by that user then that
user is framed over the entire window, contradicting the assumption that the
code was sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof. Thus we conclude that for a
sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code of the desired properties we have
n ≤ a((q − a)l−1 + (q − a)l−2 + · · ·+ (q − a) + 1). 
7.5.2 General b
It is possible to generalise the above construction to achieve codes that are
more eﬃcient than those of Construction 7.1 in the case where b > 0.
Construction 7.4. This construction is a modification of Construction 7.2;
it protects aqr
((
(q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1 + ((q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−2 + · · ·+ (q − a)qb + 1)
users, where r =
(
l− (b+1)⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉)
. At each time the marks are distributed as
in Construction 7.2, with two differences. Firstly, during ordinary segments
(those occurring at times j where (b+1) ∤ j) no users are protected. Secondly,
a sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code for which b > 0 will guarantee
that every window includes a sequence of l− b segments ending in a protection
segment, of which l−b−⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉
are ordinary segments and
⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉−1 are protec-
tion segments occurring prior to the last protection segment. We are interested
in preventing framing over these sequences. Such a sequence will start with
the
(
l − (b + 1)⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉)th
ordinary segment prior to a protection segment; we
denote this quantity by r. Whereas in the case b = 0 symbols were allocated
evenly to users who had been framed over l− 1 segments, then l− 2, l− 3 and
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so on, in this case it is only necessary to consider sets of users who have been
framed over sequences of up to l− b consecutive segments that commence with
the rth ordinary segment prior to a protection segment. This is illustrated in
the example below.
In order to show that the scheme resulting from this construction is indeed
sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof we observe that each length l window
contains an interval of l − b consecutive segments ending in a protection seg-
ment, and show that no users can be framed over such an interval.
Consider an interval of l − b consecutive segments ending in a protection
segment. Let n0 be the total number of users, and denote by ni the number
of users who are framed over the ﬁrst i segments of the interval.
The ﬁrst r segments are ordinary segments. Therefore in segment i, for
1 ≤ i ≤ r the q symbols are divided evenly among the users who were framed
for the ﬁrst i−1 segments (the fact that qr | n0 ensures this is possible). Thus
we have ni =
ni−1
q
, hence nr =
n0
qr
and
nr = a
((
(q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1 + ((q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−2 + · · ·+ (q − a)qb + 1).
Segment r + 1 is a protection segment so a of the users who have been
framed so far receive unique marks, and the remaining q−a marks are divided
evenly among the remaining framed users. Thus nr+1 =
nr−a
q−a , so
nr+1 = a
((
(q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1 + ((q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−2 + · · ·+ (q − a)qb)(q − a)−1.
The following b segments are protection segments, and qb | nr+1 so in
each of them the marks are distributed evenly among the framed users, which
implies nr+1+b =
nr+1
qb
, thus
nr+b+1 = a
((
(q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−2 + ((q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−3 + · · ·+ (q − a)qb + 1).
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Each subsequent sequence of b+1 segments consists of a protection segment
followed by b ordinary segments, so nr+γ(b+1) =
nr+(γ−1)(b+1)−a
(q−a)qb . Thus after the
γth such sequence following the ﬁrst r segments we ﬁnd
nr+γ(b+1) = a
((
(q−a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−γ−1+((q−a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−γ−2+ · · ·+(q−a)qb+1).
The (l−b−1)th segment of the interval occurs after ⌈ l−b
b+1
⌉−1 such sequences,
therefore nl−b−1 = a
((
(q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−(⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1)−1) = a. These remaining a
users are protected in the ﬁnal protection segment, hence no users have been
framed, irrespective of which marks the pirate chooses to broadcast.
Therefore we conclude that the code constructed above will indeed protect
up to
aqr
((
(q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1 + ((q − a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−2 + · · ·+ (q − a)qb + 1)
users. Note that in the case b = 0 this reduces to
a
(
(q − a)l−1 + (q − a)l−2 + · · ·+ (q − a) + 1)
as before.
Example 7.5 Let l = 5 and b = 1 with a = 1 and q = 3. Then
⌈
l−b
b+1
⌉
= 2, so
the code resulting from the above construction protects 21 users. The table
below is an example of a mark distribution that results over six time segments.
In segment 3 each of the three users u4, u5 and u6 who have been framed
over the ﬁrst two segments gets a diﬀerent symbol and then the symbols are
distributed evenly among the rest of the users. In time 4 the unique user u5
who was framed over the ﬁrst three segments is protected, the symbols 0 and
1 are distributed evenly among the remaining users u9 to u14 who were framed
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in segment 3, then they are distributed evenly among the remaining users.
1 2 3 4 5 6
u0 0 2 0 0 0 0
u1 0 0 0 0 0 0
u2 0 0 0 0 0 0
u3 0 0 0 0 0 0
u4 0 1 0 0 0 0
u5 0 1 1 2 0 0
u6 0 1 2 0 1 0
u7 1 0 0 0 1 1
u8 1 0 0 1 1 1
u9 1 0 1 0 1 1
u10 1 0 1 0 1 1
u11 1 0 1 0 1 1
u12 1 0 1 1 0 1
u13 1 0 1 1 1 1
u14 2 1 1 1 2 2
u15 2 1 2 1 2 0
u16 2 1 2 1 2 0
u17 2 1 2 1 2 0
u18 2 1 2 1 2 1
u19 2 1 2 1 2 1
u20 2 1 2 1 2 1
T 0 1 1 1 2 0

This construction is in fact optimal for the given parameters: the proof of
Theorem 7.3 can be modiﬁed to show
Theorem 7.5. Suppose there exists a q-ary sliding-window l-dynamic frame-
proof code in which every b+1th segment is a protection segment where a users
receive unique marks and the remaining segments are ordinary segments. If
this code supports n users then n satisfies
n ≤ aql−(b+1)⌈ l−bb+1⌉
((
(q−a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−1+((q−a)qb)⌈ l−bb+1⌉−2+ · · ·+(q−a)qb+1).
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7.6 Asymptotic Results
If we consider the behaviour of the above upper bound as q →∞ we see that
the degree of the leading term is l− b− 1, which is maximised when b = 0, in
which case the leading term reduces to a(q−a)l−1. In the case where q | l this
is maximised by setting a = q
l
; this results in a leading term of size (l−1)
l−1
ll
ql.
Hence we have the following.
Theorem 7.6. A sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code that uses evenly-
spaced protection segments and protects the same number of users in each
protection segment with an alphabet of size q can protect at most n users,
where
n ≤ (l − 1)
l−1
ll
ql +O(ql−1),
as q →∞ with l fixed.
Also, since the restriction of a q-ary sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof
code to the ﬁrst l time segments yields a dynamic frameproof code that can
support at most ql−1(q − 1) users we have the following:
Corollary 7.7. A sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code using an alphabet
of size q can support at most n users where
n ≤ ql +O(ql−1),
as q →∞ with l fixed.
7.7 Future Possibilities
In order to study sliding-window dynamic frameproof codes of complete gen-
erality, it would be necessary to consider codes in which the value of a varied
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with each segment. By letting a range between 0 and q− 1 this would encom-
pass all possible sliding-window dynamic frameproof codes. The discussion
of Section 6.2 gives some indication of the diﬃculties inherent in attempting
to bound the sizes of such codes. There remains the open problem do there
exist q-ary sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes supporting more users
than the ones discussed above? Also, there is a discrepancy between the two
asymptotic results given in the previous section: the degree of the leading
term is the same in each case, but the coeﬃcient diﬀers. Thus we have the re-
lated question do there exist q-ary sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof codes
of size cql +O(ql−1) where c > (l−1)
l−1
ll
?
In the case where a = 1 and b = 0 the above construction yields a code pro-
tecting (q−1)l−1+(q−2)l−2+ · · ·+(q−1)+1 users. When q is one more than
a prime power this is equal to the number of points in the (l − 1)-dimensional
projective space PG(l − 1, q − 1). This raises the question of whether a geo-
metric interpretation of this construction is possible.
The sequential frameproof model assumes complete ignorance of the pi-
rate broadcast, whereas the dynamic model assumes total knowledge of this
broadcast. All of the sliding-window dynamic frameproof schemes described
so far require the knowledge of the most recent l − 1 segments of the pirate
broadcast. Is it possible to construct schemes that only require knowledge of
the most recent m segments for some m < l − 1? Such schemes would ﬁt
between the sequential and dynamic models.
7.8 Conclusion
In this thesis we set out to investigate whether the concept of a frameproof
code could be applied in a dynamic setting to prevent pirates from framing
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innocent users when ﬁngerprinting is used with digital broadcasts. We have
shown that this is indeed possible. We now have a good understanding of
the behaviour of sequential frameproof codes, dynamic frameproof codes, and
sliding-window l-frameproof codes with regular protection. Further study will
be needed to determine the optimal size of a set of users protected by a general
q-ary sliding-window l-dynamic frameproof code, and as discussed above, other
interesting problems remain open in this area.
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